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ABSTRACT 
Assessing Actual Audit Quality 
Li Dang 
Kevin F. Brown, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
    Prior audit quality research has adopted a variety of measures for audit quality. 
Since actual audit quality is unobservable before and when the audit is conducted, 
market-perceived audit quality proxies have been widely used. However, no research 
has examined whether market-perceived audit quality can appropriately proxy for 
actual audit quality. This study addresses the research question “does market-
perceived audit quality capture actual audit quality?” Using a post hoc identification of 
“apparent audit failures” as cases of poor actual audit quality, this study examines 
whether poor actual audit quality is related to higher levels of earnings management 
and to smaller analysts’ forecast errors. 
    This study uses a matched-pair design, matching each audit failure company with a 
similar non-audit failure company.  In investigating the first research question, value 
relevance of accounting information is used as the measure of market-perceived audit 
quality. By comparing value-relevance of accounting information across audit failure 
and non-audit failure groups, this study documents that accounting information is less 
value-relevance for audit failure group. This result suggests that the market appears to 
assess actual audit quality accurately and, therefore, market-perceived audit quality 
can be used as the proxy for actual audit quality. 
    Consistent with prior studies, discretionary accruals are estimated to measure 
earnings management. Compared with the non-audit failure group, the audit failure 
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group exhibits higher levels of discretionary accruals. The result supports my 
hypothesis that poor actual audit quality is associated with higher levels of earnings 
management. The results of this study do not reveal any statistically significant 
relationship between actual audit quality and financial analysts’ forecast errors. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
     The demand for auditing arises from the auditor’s monitoring role in the 
principal-agent relationship (Eilifsen and Messier, 2000). According to agency 
theory, an agency relationship is a contract under which one or more principals 
engage an agent to perform some service on the principals’ behalf and delegate 
some decision-making authority to the agent (Jenson and Meckling, 1976). When 
there are conflicts between the interests of the principal and the agent, the agent 
may not act in the best of interests of the principal. In order to avoid or minimize 
such divergences from his or her interests, the principal can establish monitoring 
systems. The financial statement audit is a monitoring mechanism that helps reduce 
information asymmetry and protect the interests of the principals, specifically, 
stockholders and potential stockholders, by providing reasonable assurance that 
management’s financial statements are free from material misstatements (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986).  
     The performance quality of this monitoring function may vary. Audit quality 
describes how well an audit detects and reports material misstatements of financial 
statements, reduces information asymmetry between management and stockholders 
and therefore helps protect the interests of stockholders. High audit quality should 
be associated with high information quality of financial statements because 
financial statements audited by high quality auditors should be less likely to contain 
material misstatements. The purpose of this study is to provide a better 
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understanding of audit quality and to assess the validity of auditor size as a proxy 
for audit quality.  
     Following DeAngelo’s (1981) argument that size of audit firms is positively 
associated with audit quality, many studies use size (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5) as 
the audit quality proxy (Krishnan, 2003; Zhou and Elder, 2001; Bauwhede et al., 
2000; Becker et al., 1998; Hogan, 1997; Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; Firth and 
Smith, 1992a; Nichols and Smith, 1983). Many audit quality studies indicate that, 
when accounting firm size is used as the indicator of audit quality, higher audit 
quality is associated with less information asymmetry and higher information 
quality. For example, using discretionary accruals as the measure for earnings 
management, Becker et al. (1998) find that audit quality is negatively related to 
income-increasing discretionary accruals, which indicates that high audit quality is 
associated with low information asymmetry.  Teoh and Wong (1993) find that Big 
8 clients are associated with higher earnings response coefficients (ERCs). The 
ERC is the coefficient on earnings resulting from regressing stock returns on 
reported earnings. It measures the extent to which the market responds to earnings. 
     However, whether this size proxy captures both perceived audit quality and 
actual audit quality is unclear. Perceived audit quality is based on perceptions of 
financial statement users, while actual audit quality refers to the auditor’s ability to 
detect and report accounting misstatements. Financial statement users lack access 
to the evidence gathered during the audit process and to the information audited, 
and thus cannot assess actual audit quality directly. Further, prior research has not 
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clearly distinguished these concepts. Perceived audit quality and actual audit 
quality will be discussed in more detail later in this study. 
     Teoh and Wong (1993) indicate that the ERC of companies audited by Big 8 
accounting firms is higher than that of companies audited by non-Big 8 auditors. 
Since the ERC reflects the perception of audit quality by financial statement users, 
it measures perceived audit quality. Moreover, it has been shown that the perceived 
audit quality of large accounting firms is higher than that of small accounting firms, 
so that size can be used as a proxy for perceived audit quality. However, the 
distinction of the concepts of perceived audit quality and actual audit quality has 
received little empirical examination. Research has not tested whether the 
perceived audit quality proxy (i.e., size) also captures actual audit quality. 
     In order to determine whether a perceived audit quality proxy, namely, auditor 
size, might also be a suitable proxy for actual audit quality, this study first 
examines whether the perceived audit quality captures actual audit quality. The 
study also investigates the relationship between actual audit quality and earnings 
management. Different from Becker et al. (1998), this study uses a post hoc 
identification of “apparent” audit failures to measure actual audit quality. For the 
purpose of this study, the term apparent audit failure is defined as a case of material 
misstatement of financial statements indicated by SEC investigation or subsequent 
restatement of financial statements. Additionally, prior literature (e.g., Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002) indicates that managers have incentives to meet analysts’ 
earnings forecasts through earnings management. This suggests that actual audit 
quality might be related to analysts’ forecast errors. Therefore, this study examines 
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whether actual audit quality, measured by a post hoc identification of apparent 
audit failures, is related to analysts’ forecast errors. This study has implications for 
regulators, accounting information users, and accounting researchers by providing 
an enhanced understanding of actual audit quality.  
 
1.2 Perceived Audit Quality, Actual Audit Quality, and the Size Proxy 
     DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the market-assessed joint probability 
that a given auditor will both detect material misstatements in the client’s financial 
statements and report the material misstatements. This is a definition of perceived 
audit quality since DeAngelo (1981) emphasizes the role of the market in assessing 
audit quality. The willingness to report discovered material misstatements is 
defined by DeAngelo (1981) as auditor independence. Therefore, according to 
DeAngelo’s (1981) definition, audit quality is a function of the auditor’s ability to 
detect material misstatements (auditor competence) and auditor independence.  
     Since actual audit quality is unobservable before and when an audit is 
performed, a valid proxy is needed when investigating the relationships between 
actual audit quality and other factors. DeAngelo (1981) analytically demonstrates 
that auditor size has a positive relationship with audit quality, since a large audit 
firm has “more to lose” by failing to report a discovered material misstatement in a 
client’s records. Following DeAngelo’s study, many other studies empirically 
examine the relationship between auditor size and audit quality (e.g., Krishnan and 
Schauer, 2000; Colbert and Murray, 1998; and Palmrose, 1988).  
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     Among other potential audit quality measures, such as audit fee and audit hours, 
auditor firm size commonly is used as a proxy for audit quality. Specifically, 
researchers often use the dichotomous Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5 as a quality 
proxy: Big accounting firms represent high audit quality, and non-Big accounting 
firms represent low audit quality. As discussed before, this dichotomous proxy 
captures perceived audit quality. It is unclear whether this proxy also captures 
actual audit quality.
1
 Furthermore, there are two underlying assumptions when 
using this dichotomous audit quality proxy. The first is that an audit firm supplies a 
single level of audit quality across different clients at a moment in time and 
supplies a single level of audit quality across different time periods (Clarkson and 
Simunic, 1994). The second is that audit quality within one group of accounting 
firms (Big 8/6/5 accounting firms or non-Big 8/6/5 accounting firms) is 
homogeneous. These two assumptions appear to be problematic.  It is unlikely that 
an auditor can maintain one level of audit quality for all of its clients and over 
different periods of time. For instance, an auditor may have expertise in a certain 
industry and may be able to offer higher audit quality in that industry than in other 
industries. It is also unlikely that all Big 8/6/5 auditors or all non-Big 8/6/5 auditors 
offer the same level of audit quality.  
     The results of studies that test the relationship between audit quality and audit 
firm size using other proxies for audit quality (e.g., Teoh and Wong, 1993; 
Palmrose, 1988) usually support the hypothesis that audit quality and audit firm 
size are positively associated. For instance, Palmrose (1988) tests auditor size and 
                                                 
1
 Recent audit failures, such as Enron, Waste Management, and WorldCom, cast doubt on a positive 
relationship between size and actual audit quality as well as perceived audit quality. The largest 
accounting firms may have lost the perceived association with higher audit quality. 
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audit quality using litigation activity as the proxy for audit quality. Teoh and Wong 
(1993) test this relationship using earnings response coefficients to measure audit 
quality. However, the proxy used in Teoh and Wong’s (1993) study may capture 
only perceived audit quality, an auditor’s actual ability to detect and report 
accounting misstatements. Because actual audit quality is unobservable when audit 
service is provided, and some period of time must elapse before audit failures 
become apparent, it might be expedient for researchers to use a perceived audit 
quality measure. However, if perceived audit quality does not reflect actual audit 
quality, using financial statement users’ perceived audit quality to test the 
relationship among audit quality and other variables is problematic. Financial 
statement users may not be able to assess actual audit quality accurately because 
they do not have access to the audit process. This study provides some insights in 
evaluating actual audit quality and the validity of the size proxy for audit quality in 
certain circumstances.  
     This study is based on a post hoc audit quality evaluation. Apparent audit 
failures are used as a post hoc evaluation indicating poor actual audit quality. 
Consistent with the definition presented in section 1.1, apparent audit failures are 
identified as materially misstated financial statements receiving unqualified audit 
opinions. Actual audit quality are classified into two categories-“apparent audit 
failure” and “no apparent audit failure.” Several sources are used to identify 
apparent audit failures. These include the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs), companies restating financial statements because 
of past misstatements (restatements), and audit failures revealed by litigation 
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against auditors. AAERs indicate companies whose financial statements contain 
misstatements documented in SEC sanctions of companies or auditors. 
Restatements include companies that restated prior years’ financial statements 
because of significant misstatements. Restatements represent audit failures because 
initially auditors did not detect and/or report those material misstatements. Cases of 
litigation against auditors contain allegations that auditors failed to detect and 
report material misstatements. Litigation cases that provide convincing evidence of 
audit failure are included as apparent audit failures. 
     Using a post hoc identification of apparent audit failures to test the relationship 
between actual audit quality and perceived audit quality has several advantages. 
The first advantage is that apparent audit failures represent poor actual audit quality 
rather than poor perceived audit quality. Furthermore, when using apparent audit 
failures, two problematic assumptions concerning the size proxy for audit quality 
are released. Those two assumptions are that: (1) an audit firm supplies a single 
level of audit quality across clients at a moment in time and across time; and (2) 
audit quality within the same group of accounting firms is homogeneous. Using 
cases from AAERs, restatements, and litigation, apparent audit failures are 
identified for a large number of different auditors including both Big 8/6/5 auditors 
and non-Big 8/6/5 auditors. One auditor might provide both good and poor quality 
audits. Moreover, within the Big 8/6/5 audit group or non-Big 8/6/5 audit group, at 
a certain time one particular auditor might be associated with more audit failures 
than other auditors. This will show the differentiation of quality within Big 8/6/5 
and non-Big 8/6/5 audit groups. Also, testing how actual audit quality is related to 
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other variables indicating financial reporting quality, such as earnings management 
and analysts’ forecast errors, may contribute to existing audit quality research.  
 
1.3 Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
    As stated earlier, from an agency theory perspective, the audit is a monitoring 
mechanism that provides reasonable assurance that financial statements are free of 
material misstatements and therefore protects the interests of stockholders. When 
the interests of management conflict with the interests of stockholders, 
management may not act in the best interests of stockholders. Management 
compensation often is based on reported earnings. In order to maximize their 
wealth, managers have incentives to manage reported earnings and they often have 
the ability to do so.  
     According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), “earnings management occurs when 
managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported accounting numbers.”  If stockholders had perfect information 
about managers’ actions, there would be no information asymmetry between the 
two parties. Information asymmetry exists when perfect information is absent, 
which is the assumption of agency theory (Fama, 1980). Since information 
asymmetry exists, stockholders have difficulty detecting earnings management. 
Jacobides and Croson (2001) define monitoring as any collection of information by 
the principal in the agency relationship. An audit is one monitoring mechanism 
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since it helps stockholders to collect reliable information. Auditing serves to reduce 
information asymmetry, and the reduction in information asymmetry is an indicator 
of the level of audit quality (Schauer, 2001). Auditors reduce information 
asymmetry between managers and stakeholders by providing reasonable assurance 
that the financial statements are free of material misstatements (Becker, et al., 
1998). High quality audits should be more likely to successfully detect and prevent 
earnings management. Therefore, higher levels of audit quality should be 
associated with lower levels of earnings management.  
    Prior research (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991; DeAngelo, 1986; Healy, 
1985) has used discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. Actual 
total accruals consist of two components: non-discretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. Actual total accruals are defined as income before 
extraordinary items minus operating cash flows (Dechow et al., 1995). 
Nondiscretionary accruals represent the accruals that would be recorded without 
any incentives to manage earnings and are estimated from an accrual prediction 
model (Thomas and Zhang, 2000). Discretionary accruals, management’s vehicle 
for managing earnings, are calculated as the difference between fitted values of the 
prediction model and actual total accruals.  
     Prior research provides evidence that high audit quality
2
 measured by auditor 
size is associated with low discretionary accruals. Becker et al. (1998) find that 
audit quality, measured by a Big 6 vs. non-Big 6 dichotomous variable, is 
negatively related to positive discretionary accruals (income-increasing earnings 
                                                 
2
 Prior research has not clearly distinguished the concepts of actual audit quality and perceived audit 
quality.  
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management). However, using the same measurement basis, Bauwhede et al. 
(2000) indicate that audit quality is a constraint on income-decreasing earnings 
management but not on income-increasing earnings management. The conflicting 
results may suggest that the size proxy might not always capture actual audit 
quality. This study provides evidence about the relationship between actual audit 
quality and earnings management measured by discretionary accruals, using the 
sample of apparent audit failures discussed above. 
 
1.4 Audit Quality and Analysts’ Forecast Errors 
     Managers have incentives to meet both management’s earnings forecasts and 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. As indicated in the analyses of AAERs from 1997-
1999 (Public Oversight Board, 2000), two possible incentives for misstating 
financial statements are “meeting analysts’ expectations” and “meeting corporate 
earnings targets,” which reflect analysts’ earnings forecasts and management’s 
earnings forecasts respectively. Whether reported earnings meet management’s 
earnings forecasts may affect the company’s stock price, because the ability to 
reach management’s earnings forecasts is often the signal to the market that the 
company is stable and healthy. If a company cannot meet its earnings forecasts, its 
stock price may go down because of the unfavorable signal to the market.  
     In addition to the incentive to minimize the difference between management’s 
earnings forecasts and reported earnings, managers also have the incentive to meet 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Failing to meet the market’s expectations for earnings 
can cause significant penalties for a company (Robb, 1998). Penalties are 
  
11
 
commonly large drops in stock prices. Since frequent earnings surprises also affect 
investor confidence, the company’s cost of financing will increase. Therefore, 
managers have the incentive to minimize analysts’ forecast errors, that is, the 
differences between reported earnings and earnings forecasts. When managers 
believe earnings are falling below expectations, they may try to meet earnings 
forecasts through earnings management. Further, when information asymmetry 
between managers and stakeholders exists, managers are able to manage earnings 
to reach corporate earnings targets and market expectations. A high quality audit 
limits management’s ability to manage earnings because it is more likely that the 
auditor would detect earnings management and information asymmetry would be 
reduced.  Hence, holding other factors constant, analysts’ forecast errors would be 
large when audit quality is high, and vice versa. 
     While some studies have examined the association between audit quality and 
management earnings forecasts (e.g., Davidson and Neu, 1993; Clarkson, 2000), no 
research has investigated the relationship between audit quality and analysts’ 
forecast errors. This study investigates whether actual audit quality is related to 
analysts’ forecast errors. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
     The research questions addressed in this study are: 
1. Does the perceived audit quality proxy capture actual audit quality?  
2. How is actual audit quality related to earnings management? 
3. How is actual audit quality related to financial analysts’ forecast errors? 
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1.6 Overview of the Study 
     This study contains three main parts. The first part tests whether the market 
perceived audit quality also captures actual audit quality using apparent audit 
failures reflected in AAERs, restatements, and litigation against auditors. The 
second part investigates the relationship between actual audit quality and earnings 
management measured by discretionary accruals. The third part examines the 
relationship between actual audit quality and analysts’ earnings forecast errors. All 
the analyses will be done through comparisons between a group of companies 
experiencing apparent audit failures and a matched control group with similar 
characteristics. 
 
1.7 Contribution of the Study 
     This study has implications for both audit quality research and accounting 
information users. First, this study distinguishes the concepts of perceived audit 
quality and actual audit quality and tests whether market-perceived audit quality 
captures actual audit quality. Accordingly, audit quality research which has not 
clearly determined whether size is a suitable proxy for actual and perceived audit 
quality, may be informed by the results of this study. Second, this study tests how 
actual audit quality is associated with earnings management and analysts’ forecast 
errors. The empirical results of this study have implications for both researchers 
and accounting information users in that assessment of actual audit quality through 
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observing evidence of earnings management and sensitivity to analysts’ forecast 
errors may be clarified.  
 
1.8 Organization of the Study 
     The reminder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant research and presents the theoretical foundation for the testable 
hypotheses. Chapter 3 contains the methodology for this study, including a 
description of the sample selection and models to be tested. Chapter 4 presents 
sample characteristics, descriptive statistics and testing results. Chapter 5 provides 
conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
HYPOTHESES 
 
2. 1 Introduction 
     The focus of this study is to test whether the market-perceived audit quality 
captures actual audit quality. It also investigates the relationships among actual 
audit quality measured by a post hoc identification of auditor failures and earnings 
management as well as financial analysts’ forecast errors. Prior literature in audit 
quality, earnings management and financial analysts’ forecast errors are reviewed 
in this chapter. Hypotheses are developed based on prior literature. 
 
2.2 Review of Audit Quality and Actual Audit Quality 
     Audit quality has been a topic of significant interest in accounting research. In 
order to improve the understanding of audit quality, numerous studies have tried to 
detect the association between audit quality and other variables. However, since 
audit quality is difficult to observe, studies have operationalized it in different 
ways. This section reviews the literature defining audit quality and describing audit 
quality proxies. 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Audit Quality  
     One common definition of audit quality is provided by DeAngelo (1981). She 
defines audit quality as “the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor 
will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting system, and (b) report the 
breach.” The probability that the auditor will report the detected misstatements is 
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defined by DeAngelo (1981) as auditor independence. Therefore, according to 
DeAnglo’s (1981) definition, audit quality is an increasing function of an auditor’s 
ability to detect accounting misstatements and auditor independence as assessed by 
the market. DeAngelo’s (1981) definition refers to “market-assessed” or perceived 
audit quality. When applying this definition to actual audit quality, there is an 
underlying assumption that market perceived audit quality reflects actual audit 
quality. However, many studies (e.g., Krishnan, 2003; Krishnan and Schauer, 2000; 
Deis and Giroux, 1992) adopt this definition without addressing the distinction 
between these two different concepts.  
     Palmrose (1988) defines audit quality in terms of level of assurance. Since the 
purpose of an audit is to provide assurance on financial statements, audit quality is 
the probability that financial statements contain no material misstatements. In fact, 
this definition uses the results of the audit, that is, reliability of audited financial 
statements to reflect audit quality. This definition leads to the following question: 
“How do financial statement users assess the level of assurance and reliability of 
audited financial statements?” This is a post hoc audit quality definition because 
the assurance level cannot be assessed until the audit has been conducted. As a 
result, Palmrose’s definition refers to actual audit quality. 
     Other researchers also have suggested definitions for audit quality. For example, 
Titman and Trueman (1986) define auditor quality
3
 in terms of the accuracy of 
information the auditor supplies to investors. Their definition is similar to the one 
provided by Palmrose (1988). Davidson and Neu (1993) provide an audit quality 
                                                 
3
 Titman and Trueman (1986) provide a definition of auditor quality rather than audit quality. 
Although audit quality and auditor quality might be different concepts, prior studies have not clearly 
distinguished these two terms.  
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definition that is based on the auditor’s ability to detect and eliminate material 
misstatements and manipulations in reported net income. Lam and Chang (1994) 
suggest that audit quality should be defined on a engagement-by-engagement
4
 
rather than on a firm basis. 
     An important issue regarding the definition of audit quality is whether to 
distinguish auditor quality from audit quality. Many studies do not make this 
distinction and even use the concepts interchangeably (e.g., Clarkson, 1998; 
Colbert and Murray, 1998). Under certain conditions, auditor quality and audit 
quality might be used interchangeably. For instance, according to assumptions 
underlying DeAngelo’s (1981) audit quality definition, when an auditor provides 
only one level of quality of audit service, auditor quality and audit quality can be 
used interchangeably. However, as stated earlier, this assumption may be 
problematic. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all of the largest audit firms have 
been associated with audit failures. Therefore, auditor quality should be defined as 
the overall audit service quality of a certain audit firm. Meanwhile, as Lam and 
Chang (1994) have pointed out, audit quality should be defined on a service-by-
service basis because an audit firm may not conduct all its audits with the same 
level of quality. In other words, auditor quality is a firm-based concept and audit 
quality is a service-by-service based concept. Therefore, it is important to 
distinguish these two concepts based on the purposes of different studies. The 
current study focuses on the concept of audit quality rather than auditor quality. 
                                                 
4
 If audit quality is defined on a engagement-by-engagement, audit quality will reflect the service 
performance of a particular audit. 
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     Perceived audit quality and actual audit quality appear to be different concepts. 
Although it is more important to investigate actual audit quality issues because the 
goal is to better understand actual audit quality, it is usually difficult to measure it 
directly. Actual audit quality is unobservable and can be evaluated only after audits 
have been conducted. For example, Palmrose (1988) measures actual audit quality 
using auditors’ litigation activities. Deis and Giroux (1992) analyze quality control 
reviews to get a measure of actual audit quality in the public sector. Krishnan and 
Schauer’s (2000) measure of actual audit quality is based on how audited financial 
statements comply with eight specific GAAP reporting requirements. Deis and 
Giroux (1992) and Krishnan and Sauer (2000) both measure actual audit quality in 
the not-for-profit sector. These two studies benefit from the availability of quality 
measures because of their context, but might suffer from generalization problems.
5
 
     Many studies test perceived audit quality due to the difficulty of measuring 
actual quality directly. DeAngelo (1981) analytically demonstrates that the larger 
the auditor, the less incentive the auditor has to behave opportunistically and the 
higher the perceived quality of the audit. Teoh and Wong (1993) test whether 
perceived audit quality is different between Big 8 and non-Big 8 accounting firms. 
Moreland (1995) investigates how SEC enforcement actions against Big 8/6 
accounting firms affect their market perceived audit quality. Hogan (1997) 
documents that the perception of higher audit quality is associated with less 
underpricing in the IPO market. Balsam et al. (2000) examine whether industry 
specialization increases market perceived audit quality.  
                                                 
5
 These two studies (Deis and Giroux, 1992, and Krishnan and Sauer, 2000) use available actual 
audit quality measures in the not-for-profit sector. However, results of studies in the not-for-profit 
sector might not be able generalizable to a for-profit setting. 
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     Although it is difficult to measure actual audit quality, market perceptions of 
audit quality are more amenable to measurement. The market response to audited 
accounting information can be observed. If the market were completely efficient, 
market perceived audit quality would always capture actual audit quality. 
Researchers may benefit from better understanding the relationship between 
perceived audit quality and other variables because the results of perceived audit 
quality studies may be applied to research questions regarding actual audit quality 
issues. However, if the market fails to assess actual audit quality in some 
circumstances, perceived audit quality will not capture actual audit quality in those 
situations. Therefore, it may be interesting to test whether perceived audit quality 
captures actual audit quality.  
 
2.2.2 Audit Quality Measures and the Size Proxy 
     Despite actual audit quality not being observable before post hoc evaluations of 
audit is performance are available, many researchers have tried different ways to 
measure it either directly or indirectly. DeAngelo (1981) analytically demonstrates 
that auditor size is positively related to audit quality. In her study, auditor size is 
measured by number of clients. She argues that since auditors earn client-specific 
quasi-rents, auditors with more clients have more to lose by failing to report 
discovered misstatements in financial statements. Based on DeAngelo’s (1981) 
analytical results, many studies use auditor size, specifically Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 
8/6/5, to differentiate audit quality levels (e.g., Krishnan, 2003; Zhou and Elder, 
2001; Bauwhede et al., 2000; Becker et al., 1998; Clarkson and Simunic, 1994; 
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Copley, 1991).  While auditor size (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5) is the most 
commonly used audit quality measure, other measures also have been used. 
     Some studies have used audit fees as quality measures. Palmrose (1986) finds 
that there is a significant association between audit fees and auditor size measured 
by a Big 8 vs. non-Big 8 dichotomy. If the size proxy, that is, Big 8 vs. non-Big 8, 
is a measure for perceived audit quality, audit fees could be another perceived audit 
quality measure. Copley (1991) finds that using audit fees as the audit quality 
measure has greater power than a Big 8 vs. non-Big 8 dichotomy in explaining 
variation levels of local government disclosure.  
     A wide variety of prior research projects have proposed alternatives for 
measuring audit quality. Teoh and Wong (1993) indirectly measure audit quality 
using earnings response coefficients. Chow and Wong-Boren (1986) use loan 
officers’ perception to indicate audit quality. Shauer (2001) measures audit quality 
using client bid-ask spread, which is the difference between the ask price and bid 
price for a client company’s stock. Colbert and Murray (1998) measure audit 
quality using the results of peer review. 
     Other studies use more direct measures of audit quality. For example, Deis and 
Giroux (1992) analyze quality control reviews of actual audit engagements and use 
the results to differentiate audit quality levels in the public sector.  The audit quality 
measure in Krishnan and Schauer’s (2000) study is based on entities’ compliance 
with GAAP reporting requirements, assuming that extent of compliance with 
GAAP is likely to be directly related to the probability of detecting and reporting 
material misstatements.  
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     Assuming that managers have incentives to meet their own earnings forecasts, 
Davidson and Neu (1993) measure audit quality using management forecast errors 
in a Canadian setting. Management forecast errors are the absolute values of 
differences between reported earnings and management forecast earnings, where 
higher forecast errors indicate higher audit quality and lower forecast errors 
indicate lower audit quality. In their study, they assume that management earnings 
forecasts are independent from audit quality because management earnings 
forecasts were not audited but only reviewed by auditors in Canada during the 
period
6
 of the study. Therefore, the higher the audit quality, the lower the ability of 
management to meet its earnings forecasts through earnings management and the 
larger the earnings forecast errors. In Lam and Chang’s (1994) study, audit quality 
also is measured by earnings forecasts errors in prospectuses of initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in Singapore. However, different from Davidson and Neu’s (1993) 
measurement approach, they argue that higher forecast errors should reflect a lower 
audit quality level because, in Singapore, earnings forecasts are verified and 
certified by company auditors. In this case, management’s earnings forecasts are 
not independent from audit quality. On the contrary, these forecasts are affected by 
audit quality. Therefore, in this context, higher audit quality should be associated 
with smaller errors in management’s earnings forecasts.  
     Many studies document that Big 8/6/5 auditors provide higher audit quality than 
non-Big 8/6/5 auditors (e.g., Davidson and Neu, 1993; Teoh and Wong, 1993). 
                                                 
6
 The testing period of Davidson and Neu’s (1993) study is 1983-1987. During that period, 
independent auditors only reviewed management’s forecast assumptions for reasonableness. As 
noted in McConomy (1997), there was a shift from review- to audit-level assurance for management 
earnings forecasts in July 1989 in Canada. 
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However, there are also studies indicating that Big 8/6/5 auditors might not always 
provide higher quality audit service than do non-Big 8/6/5 auditors. Kim et al. 
(2002) investigate how differentiation of audit effectiveness between Big 6 and 
non-Big 6 auditors is affected by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives 
of corporate managers and external auditors. When managers have incentives to 
overstate reported earnings through income-increasing accrual choices, auditor 
conservatism creates a conflict between managers and auditors. When managers 
have incentives to understate reported earnings through income-decreasing accrual 
choices, auditor conservatism creates a convergence between managers and 
auditors. The authors use current relative performance to determine managers’ 
incentives. Current relative performance is measured by the difference between 
operating cash flows in the current year divided by lagged total assets and the 
median cash flow performance in each industry to which a company belongs. They 
find that Big 6 auditors are more (less) effective in preventing earnings 
management than non-Big 6 auditors in the presence (absence) of reporting 
incentive conflicts between managers and auditors.  
     Lam and Chang (1994) investigate the relationship between audit quality and 
auditor size using the mean error in earnings forecasts as an audit quality measure 
in prospectuses of IPOs in Singapore. They find that, on average, use of a Big 6 
auditor does not result in smaller prediction errors in earnings forecasts than does 
use of a non-Big 6 audit firm. Petroni and Beasley (1996) find no systematic 
difference in claim loss reserve accuracy or bias between clients of Big 8 auditors 
and clients of other auditors. Tate (2001) examines the results of financial 
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statement and compliance audits performed in accordance with the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget’s A-133 requirements.
7
 She finds that, although Big 6 
auditors report more questioned costs and more findings than non-Big 6 auditors, 
Big 6 auditors are less likely to issue qualified opinions given their clients’ 
deficiencies in internal control than non-Big 6 auditors. 
     Although many studies support the argument that Big 8/6/5 auditors provide 
higher-quality audit service than non-Big 8/6/5 auditors, other studies have found 
conflicting results. Size might not be an effective proxy for audit quality in certain 
circumstances. Perhaps, as Lam and Chang (1994) suggest, audit quality might be 
assessed more effectively on a service-by-service basis. This study offers an 
opportunity to investigate directly whether the market appropriately assesses actual 
audit quality, in other words, whether market perceived audit quality reflects actual 
audit quality. 
 
2.3 Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
     If managers and shareholders are both utility maximizers, managers may not act 
in the best interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Specifically, if 
the compensation of managers is associated with companies’ performance, 
managers have incentives to misreport earnings. “The demand for auditing services 
arises from a need to facilitate dealings between the parties involved in business 
                                                 
7
 Using a database of almost 77,000 compliance and financial statement audit results for non-profit 
organizations, Tate (2001) finds Big 5 auditors report more noncompliance with federal regulations 
in the form of findings and questioned costs than non-Big 5 auditors. However, after controlling for 
the number and extent of errors identified by the auditor, she finds size auditors are less likely than 
non-size auditors to qualify their report on an organization’s compliance with federal regulations. 
She also finds that size auditors are less likely than non-Big 5 auditors to report significant 
deficiencies in internal control. 
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relationships—shareholders, creditors, public authorities, employees and 
customers, etc. Exchanges between such parties are usually costly since 
informational asymmetries give rise to uncertainty concerning the performance of 
the contractual obligations” (Arrunada, 2000). The function of auditing is to 
mitigate information asymmetries among related parties. High audit quality should 
be related to low levels of information asymmetry and low levels of “uncertainty 
concerning performance.” Therefore, audit quality should be negatively related to 
earnings management. 
     Several studies have tested how auditing affects earnings management. For 
example, Becker et al. (1998) examine the effect of audit quality on earnings 
management through discretionary accruals and find that discretionary accruals of 
clients of Big 6 auditors are lower than discretionary accruals of clients of non-Big 
6 auditors. However, they did not test for income-decreasing discretionary accruals 
but only income-increasing earnings management. Bauwhede et al. (2000) 
document that audit quality and public ownership act as constraints on income-
decreasing earnings management but not on income-increasing earnings 
management in Belgium.  
 
2.3.1 Earnings Management Research 
     In order to test the relationship between audit quality and earnings management, 
it is necessary to describe earnings management in greater detail. In the following 
sections, I will review some related earnings management studies that define 
earnings management and provide earnings management models. 
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2.3.1.1 Definition of Earnings Management 
     Earnings management has been defined in different ways. Schipper (1989) 
defines earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, 
say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)….” Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) propose that “earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.” Although earnings management might be defined differently, there 
seems to be the same underlying concept that earnings management distorts a 
company’s real performance. Considering these two definitions, earnings 
management in this study is defined as purposeful activities that managers conduct 
to mislead some information users in order to obtain some private gain.  
     Healy and Wahlen (1999) summarize the incentives of managers to engage in 
earnings management. Managers have incentives to manage earnings when 
contracts between a company and other parties are based on accounting results. 
Some contractual incentives include maximizing management compensation, 
complying with debt covenants, ensuring job security, and facilitating union 
negotiations. Managers also manage earnings to impact the market. For example, 
earnings can be managed in periods surrounding IPOs (Teoh et al., 1998a) and 
seasoned equity offerings (Teoh et al., 1998b; Rangan, 1998) to increase offering 
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prices of the stock. Also, managers have incentives to meet earnings forecasts 
because the market appears to penalize companies that miss analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Robb, 1998). 
 
2.3.1.2 Estimation of Earnings Management 
     Dechow et al. (1995) state, “Analysis of earnings management often focuses on 
management’s use of discretionary accruals.” There are several accrual-based 
models for detecting earnings management. For example, Healy (1985) estimates 
discretionary accruals using a two-step process. First, he estimates nondiscretionary 
accruals by scaling the mean of total accruals by lagged total assets from the 
estimation period. Second, discretionary accruals are measured by the difference 
between event year total accruals scaled by lagged total assets and estimated 
nondiscretionary accruals.  
     Some models decompose total accruals into nondiscretionary accruals and 
discretionary accruals. These models first estimate nondiscretionary accruals, then 
subtract these estimated nondiscretionary accruals from event year total accruals to 
yield discretionary accruals (DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). 
For example, DeAngelo (1986) models nondiscretionary accruals as the prior 
period’s total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. When estimating 
nondiscretionary accruals, Jones (1991) considers the changes in a company’s 
economic circumstances, such as changes in revenues and changes in fixed assets. 
Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones Model (Modified Jones Model) to control 
for a change in receivables when estimating nondiscretionary accruals. Dechow et 
  
26
 
al. (1995) also use an Industry Model in which nondiscretionary accruals are 
measured using the median of total accruals scaled by lagged total assets in the 
same industry. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994b) use a cross-sectional version of the 
Jones Model (Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model) that estimates the parameters 
of the models using cross-sectional data rather than time-series data. 
     Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate the performance of several models in detecting 
earnings management by comparing the specification and power of commonly used 
test statistics across the measures of discretionary accruals generated by those 
models. They conclude that the Modified Jones Model provides the most powerful 
tests of earnings management. Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2002) further provide 
evidence that the Cross-Sectional Jones Model and the Cross-Sectional Modified 
Jones Model both perform better than their time-series counterparts. In 
investigating the relationship between earnings management and audit quality 
issues, many current studies use the Cross-Sectional Jones or Modified Jones 
Model (e.g., Becker et al., 1998; Davis et al., 2000; Krishnan, 2003). The current 
study uses the Cross-Sectional Modified Jones Model to estimate earnings 
management. 
 
2.4 Audit Quality and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors 
     Prior research has tested the relationship between audit quality and management 
earnings forecast errors in different settings. Assuming that managers have 
incentives to minimize the difference between management forecasted earnings and 
reported earnings, Davidson and Neu (1993) argue that higher auditor quality 
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should be associated with larger management earnings forecast errors. Specifically, 
they find that Big 8 accounting firms are associated with larger management 
earnings forecast errors. Clarkson (2000) extends Davidson and Neu’s (1993) study 
for two distinct time periods in Canada. During the first period, 1984-1987, 
Canadian auditors had a responsibility to review management’s earnings forecasts. 
During the second period, 1992-1995, Canadian auditors audited management’s 
earnings forecasts. Using data from the audit assurance period, Clarkson (2000) 
documents that Big 6 auditors are associated with smaller, not larger, absolute 
earnings forecast errors. The contrast between these two testing periods suggests 
that whether management’s earnings forecasts are independent from audit quality 
has an impact on the ability to use management’s earnings forecast errors to 
measure audit quality. Other studies have investigated the association between 
audit quality and management forecast errors in an IPO setting. Firth and Smith 
(1992a, 1992b) fail to detect a significant relationship between auditor size (Big 8 
vs. non-Big 8) and the accuracy of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses.  
     The relationship between audit quality and analysts’ forecast errors may provide 
more insights into audit quality for the U.S. setting because while managers have 
the incentive to “meet or beat” these earnings forecast targets, auditor assurance 
does not influence the forecasting process of external analysts. Prior research has 
documented managers’ incentives to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. In an 
analysis of AAERs covering the period from 1997 to 1999, the Public Oversight 
Board (2000) reports that one of the motivations for companies to misstate their 
financial statements is “meeting financial analysts’ earnings forecasts”(p. 228). 
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Recent studies provide the reasons for such incentives. Kasznik and McNichols 
(2002) investigate whether the market rewards companies meeting current period 
earnings expectations and find that abnormal annual returns are significantly 
greater for companies meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts. Bartov, Govly, and 
Hayn (2002) find that companies that meet current analysts' expectations enjoy a 
higher return over the quarter than firms that fail to meet these expectations. They 
suggest that meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts is likely to have been achieved by 
earnings or expectations management. However, there has not been extensive 
investigation of the relationship between audit quality and analysts’ forecast errors. 
Davis et al. (2000) find that the absolute value of analysts’ forecast errors declines 
with increases in auditor tenure and that a client’s ability to exceed analysts’ 
forecasts improves with increased auditor tenure. This suggests that managers are 
able to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts more easily as auditor tenure increases. If 
auditor tenure is related to auditor independence, audit quality also may be 
associated with financial analysts’ forecast errors since auditor independence is a 
component of audit quality. 
 
2.5 Development of Hypotheses 
2.5.1  Introduction 
     Prior research has shown that audit quality is positively associated with audit 
firm size (e.g., Krishnan and Schauer, 2000; Lennox, 1999; Colbert and Murray, 
1998; Deis and Giroux, 1992; Palmrose, 1988; DeAngelo, 1981). However, there is 
other evidence showing that size may not always be positively related to audit 
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quality and that the largest accounting firms may not always provide higher quality 
audits than do small accounting firms (e.g., Tate, 2001; Lam and Chang, 1994). 
The results of these studies indicate that size may reflect only users’ perceived 
audit quality.  
     This study has an opportunity to contribute to existing research by investigating 
the association among actual audit quality and other variables such as earnings 
management and analysts’ forecast errors to provide evidence about relationships 
among them using a post hoc actual audit quality assessment. This study examines 
whether the perceived audit quality proxy used in prior research (i.e., size) also 
captures actual audit quality. This study also examines the association among 
actual audit quality, earnings management and analyst earnings forecast errors 
using a post hoc audit quality evaluation. Hypotheses are developed in the 
following sections. 
 
2.5.2 Perceived Audit Quality and Actual Audit Quality 
     Investigating whether size is a valid proxy for actual audit quality might provide 
insights for audit quality research, specifically, evidence of how well the market 
assesses audit quality. DeAngelo’s (1981) argument for a positive relationship 
between auditor size and audit quality assumes market transparency. However, it is 
unclear whether financial statement users assess audit quality accurately. It is 
possible that the size effect is so significant that the market assesses audit quality 
mainly on the basis of auditor reputation rather than on the auditor’s ability to 
detect and report material misstatements of financial statements for specific audits.  
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     Apparent audit failures provide a way of testing the accuracy of the market 
assessment of actual audit quality because they provide less ambiguous, post hoc 
quality determinations. In order to provide insights into audit quality, this study 
examines whether the value-relevance of accounting information is different for 
companies experiencing apparent audit failures than for companies not 
experiencing apparent audit failures. Value-relevance indicates the extent to which 
accounting information explains the variation of market prices. If financial 
statement users assess actual audit quality accurately, the association between stock 
price and accounting information should be weak when actual audit quality is poor 
because accounting information should be viewed as less reliable for stock 
investment decision making. Following prior studies (Amir, 1996; Amir and Lev, 
1996; Collins et al., 1997; Rees, 1999; Rajgopal et al., 2002), the Ohlson Model 
(Ohlson, 1995) is used to test the value-relevance of accounting information. The 
Ohlson Model relates a company’s market value to its contemporaneous accounting 
information. Specifically, this model provides a structure for empirical study of the 
relationship between equity values and both earnings and book values (Stober, 
1999).  
     The value-relevance level is measured by the R
2
 of the Ohlson Model (Collins et 
al., 1997; Rees, 1999; Rajgopal, 2002).  R
2
 is a measure for the association between 
a dependent variable and independent variables in a regression model. It measures 
how much of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by independent 
variables. When financial statement users perceive higher audit quality and 
therefore more reliable financial statements, accounting information such as 
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earnings and book values should explain more of the variation in stock prices. 
Additionally, the power of accounting information in explaining the changes in 
prices should be greater. If financial statement users assess audit quality accurately, 
the power of accounting information in explaining stock price changes should be 
low (high) when actual audit quality is low (high). However, if users cannot assess 
audit quality accurately, the above relationship might not hold. This discussion 
leads to the first hypothesis, stated as follows:  
H1: The explanatory power of earnings and book values for stock prices of 
companies experiencing apparent audit failures will be lower than the 
explanatory power for a matched group of companies that have not 
experienced apparent audit failures. 
   
2.5.3 Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
     Prior research has not investigated the relationship among actual audit quality 
and other variables such as earnings management and analysts’ earnings forecast 
errors using a post hoc audit quality assessment. Many of the prior studies that test 
the relationship between audit quality and earnings management use the size proxy 
for audit quality (Bauwhede et al., 2000; Davis et al., 2000; Becker et al, 1998). As 
stated in the prior section, financial statement users may not assess audit quality 
accurately, and size might not be able to capture actual audit quality. Furthermore, 
the size proxy cannot reflect differences among auditors within the Big 8/6/5 or 
capture variations across different periods. The post hoc identification of apparent 
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audit failures helps to test the relationship between actual audit quality and earnings 
management.  
     Management compensation often is based on reported earnings. Managers have 
incentives to manage earnings to maximize their wealth. Management’s ability to 
manage earnings increases as the information asymmetry between management and 
stakeholders increases (Zhou and Elder, 2001). Therefore, higher-quality audits 
should be associated with less information asymmetry and should be more likely to 
successfully prevent and detect earnings management. Following Becker et al. 
(1998), the level of earnings management thus should be associated with audit 
quality. The current study is different from Becker et al.’s (1998) study in that size 
proxy is not used as the quality proxy. Instead, audit quality is determined by post 
hoc identification of apparent audit failures. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Companies experiencing apparent audit failures will exhibit higher 
levels of earnings management measured by discretionary accruals than 
similar companies that have not experienced apparent audit failures. 
 
2.5.4 Audit Quality and Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors 
     As suggested by prior research (e.g., Robb, 1998; POB, 2000), managers have 
incentives to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. Assuming that managers have 
incentives to minimize the difference between analysts’ forecasted and reported 
earnings, lower-quality audits will tend to be associated with smaller analysts’ 
forecast errors. Moreover, prior research has suggested that a high-quality audit 
may effectively prevent the company’s ability to manage earnings with respect to 
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analysts’ forecasts (Davis et al., 2000). Using a post hoc identification of apparent 
audit failures provides an opportunity to investigate the relationship between actual 
audit quality and analysts’ forecast errors. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3:  Companies experiencing apparent audit failures will exhibit lower 
levels of analysts’ forecast errors than similar companies that have not 
experienced apparent audit failures. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
     The purpose of this chapter was to review prior literature in audit quality, 
earnings management, and analysts’ forecast errors, and to propose testable 
hypotheses based on theoretical frameworks of prior research. The next chapter will 
describe sample selection and models used to test the proposed hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
     This chapter presents sample selection procedures, models used to test 
hypotheses, and data analyses. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection 
    This section identifies the data sources from which data are collected. 
  
3.2.1 Cases of Apparent Audit Failures 
     Companies included in this study are selected from three major sources: the 
SEC’s AAERs, restatements of financial statements in the Wall Street Journal 
Index and Lexis-Nexis news library, and news accounts of litigation alleging audit 
failures for the period 1990-2000. The initial sample is the combination of these 
three data sources. As stated by Palmrose (1988), auditors’ failure to detect material 
misstatements of financial statements results in “audit failures.” These three 
sources help identify apparent audit failures as defined in Chapter 1 of this study. 
AAERs indicate that the SEC has determined that companies that had 
misstatements in their financial reports. Another source is a search of news in the 
Wall Street Journal Index using “restatement” as the keyword. Additionally, the 
Wall Street Journal Index serves as the source of the litigation news accounts to be 
reviewed. Lawsuits seeking damages from auditors are not always indicative of 
auditors’ failure to adhere to professional standards. However, a careful review of 
such cases helped to ensure that only apparent audit failures found in the sources 
noted above are captured in the sample. 
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3.2.2 Accounting, Prices, and Earnings Forecast Data 
     In order to perform hypothesis testing, all accounting data necessary for testing 
the proposed relationships for companies selected from AAERs, the Wall Street 
Journal Index, and litigation databases is extracted from the COMPUSTAT 
database. Price information is selected from CRSP. Analysts’ most recent 
consensus earnings forecasts are found in the Zack’s database. 
 
3.2.3 Matching of Companies to a Control Group 
     A matched control group is selected based on established matching criteria. 
Matching is based on several criteria, including the year of financial statements, 
auditor size (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5), client industry, and client size. The 
matching procedure for different situations is discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. The required accounting data, prices, and analysts’ earnings forecast 
information is compiled for the matched control group from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, 
and Zack’s databases, respectively. 
 
3.3 Models and Approach to Testing 
     This section presents the models and methods used to test the hypotheses.  
 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
     In order to test whether perceived audit quality captures actual audit quality, this 
study investigates whether actual audit quality is assessed accurately. Because 
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auditing is a monitoring device that adds assurance to financial statements, ceteris 
paribus, financial statement users should view financial statements associated with 
high-quality audits as more reliable than financial statements associated with low-
quality audits. In other words, value-relevance levels of accounting data associated 
with high-quality audits and low-quality audits should be different. If an audit is 
perceived to be of higher quality, the financial statements associated with that audit 
should be perceived to be more reliable. Investors will rely more heavily on 
accounting data when perceived audit quality is higher. Therefore, value-relevance 
of accounting data should reflect perceived audit quality.  
 
3.3.1.1 Model Specification 
     The model used to test the first hypothesis is Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model. 
Ohlson (1995) analytically demonstrates that a company’s market value can be 
expressed by its contemporaneous abnormal earnings and book value. Following 
Amir (1996), Amir and Lev (1996), and Collins et al. (1997), the current study 
applies the Ohlson Model expressed as follows: 
itititit BVPSEPSP εαα ++= 21                                            (Equation 3.1) 
where: 
itP            = stock price of the company i’s equity at time t; 
           itEPS       = company i’s reported earnings per share before extraordinary  
            items for period t; 
 
itBVPS     = company i’s book value of equity per share at time t; 
itε             = random error term with mean 0 and variance 1; 
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1α  and 2α = the  regression coefficients. 
 
3.3.1.2 Testing of Hypothesis 1 
     To test whether financial statement users systematically fail to assess actual 
audit quality, the explanatory power of the Ohlson Model is evaluated by testing 
the difference in the R
2
s between a group of companies experiencing apparent audit 
failures, and a matched control group of companies that have not experienced 
apparent audit failures. For each comparison, two OLS regressions of the Ohlson 
Model are performed, one for the audit failure group, and the other for the matched 
control group. As stated earlier, value-relevance of accounting information may 
indicate perceived audit quality. If perceived audit quality is high, accounting 
information should explain more variation in companies’ stock price. If perceived 
audit quality is low, accounting information should explain less variation in stock 
price. Further, the association between stock price and accounting data will be 
weak. If the market evaluates audit quality appropriately, the explanatory power 
(R
2
) of the Ohlson model for the audit failure group should be lower than the 
explanatory power for the control group.  
     In order to test H1, a comparison is made between an apparent audit failure 
group of companies and a matched control group of companies that have not 
experienced apparent audit failure. If the R
2
 for the audit failure group is lower than 
the R
2
 for the matched control group, it suggests that the market assesses actual 
audit quality accurately. If the R
2
 for the audit failure group is equal to or higher 
than the R
2
 for the matched control group, it suggests that the market may not 
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assess actual audit quality accurately. Moreover, financial statement users’ ability 
to assess actual audit quality might be different in different situations. For example, 
the ability to assess actual audit quality might depend on whether the auditor is a 
Big 8/6/5 auditor or non-Big 8/6/5 auditor. Comparisons to test H1 are summarized 
in the following table: 
 
Results and Implications 
 
 
Comparison 
 
 
Failure Group 
(AF) Auditor 
 
 
Non-Failure 
Group (NAF) 
Auditor 
If R
2 
AF<R
2
NAF If R
2 
AF >=R
2
NAF 
 
1 
Both Big 8/6/5 
and non-Big 8/6/5 
auditor 
Both Big 8/6/5 
and non-Big 
8/6/5 auditor 
The market 
assesses actual 
audit quality 
accurately 
The market may not 
assess actual audit 
quality accurately 
 
 
2 
 
 
Big 8/6/5 auditor 
 
 
Big 8/6/5 auditor 
The market 
assesses actual 
audit quality 
accurately for Big 
8/6/5 auditors 
The market may not 
assess actual audit 
quality accurately for 
Big 8/6/5 auditors 
 
 
3 
 
Non-Big 8/6/5 
auditor 
 
Non-Big 8/6/5 
auditor 
The market 
assesses actual 
audit quality 
accurately for non-
Big 8/6/5 auditors 
The market may not 
assess actual audit 
quality accurately for 
non-Big 8/6/5 
auditors 
 
 
4 
 
Big 8/6/5 auditor 
 
Non-Big 8/6/5 
auditor 
The market 
assesses actual 
audit quality 
accurately 
regardless of 
auditor size 
Market assessment 
may be 
dysfunctionally 
influenced by auditor 
size 
 
5 
 
Non-Big 8/6/5 
auditor 
 
Big 8/6/5 auditor 
The market 
assesses actual 
audit quality 
accurately 
regardless of 
auditor size 
Market assessment 
may be 
dysfunctionally 
influenced by auditor 
size 
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3.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
3.3.2.1 Estimation of Earnings Management 
     Prior research suggests that earnings management can be measured by 
discretionary accruals (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995). Because an important function of 
auditing is to decrease information asymmetry between management and 
stakeholders, auditors that provide higher-quality service should be more likely to 
detect earnings manipulation by management. Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
discretionary accruals should be negatively related to audit quality. Consistent with 
Becker et al. (1998), this study measures discretionary accruals using the Cross-
Sectional Modified Jones Model. Discretionary accruals are estimated from the 
following model: 
( ) ijtijtjtjt
ijt
jtijt PPERECREV
TA
TAC εααα ++∆−∆+







=
−
32
1
1
1
  
                                                                                               (Equation 3.2) 
     Where: 
ijtTAC       = total accruals for sample company i in industry j at period t  
scaled by lagged assets; 
 
1−ijtTA       = lagged assets, total assets for sample company i in industry j at  
 period 1−t ; 
 
ijtREV∆    = change in net revenues for sample company  i  in industry j at 
period t ; 
 
ijtREC∆   = change in net receivables for sample company i in industry j at 
period t; 
 
ijtPPE     = gross property plant and  equipment  for sample company i  in   
 industry j at period t ; 
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jt1α , jt2α , jt3α = coefficients of the regression model; 
ijtε          = random error term 
     Consistent with prior research (e.g., Becker et al., 1998), total accruals are 
defined as income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows. OLS 
regression is used to obtain industry-specific estimates for jt1α , jt2α , and jt3α for 
the model. The residuals (the difference between fitted values and actual total 
accruals) are the discretionary accruals: 
|ˆ| ijtitit CATTACDAC −=  
 
3.3.2.2 Model Specification 
     After discretionary accruals have been estimated using the Cross-Sectional 
Modified Jones Model, the following model is used to test H2: 
 
ititit
ititititit
ABTACOCF
LGTALEVMTBAFDA
ελλ
λλλλλ
+++
+++++=
65
43210
                 
                                                                                            (Equation 3.3) 
     where, 
itDA       = absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the Modified  
Jones Model; 
 
itAF          = audit failure taking value 1 if company i is from the audit 
failure group, 0 otherwise;  
 
itMTB        = the ratio of market to book value of equity; 
itLEV       = leverage, defined as total debts over total assets; 
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itLTA       = natural logarithm of total assets; 
itABTAC  = absolute value of total accruals; 
itOCF       = operating cash flows; 
0λ            = the intercept of the regression model; 
621 ,.., λλλ = coefficients of the regression model; 
itε            = random error term with mean 0 and variance 1. 
     Additional factors that might have an effect on earnings management are 
included in the model as control variables. As stated earlier, a company’s market-
to-book value is a proxy for growth opportunities and may affect earnings 
management, as suggested by Zhou and Elder (2001). Prior research suggests that 
leverage might be associated with earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Company size is included to control for the size 
effect. Becker et al. (1998) argue that a client’s accrual-generating potential and 
operating cash flows also might affect earnings management. The absolute value of 
total accruals is added as a proxy for a company’s accrual-generating potential. 
 
3.3.2.3 Testing of Hypothesis 2 
     To test H2, first the mean discretionary accruals between the audit failure and 
non-audit failure groups are compared using a t-test and a non-parametric 
Wilcoxon test. Significantly higher mean discretionary accruals of the audit failure 
group compared with those of the matched control group suggests that poor actual 
audit quality is associated with higher levels of earnings management. Next, the 
OLS regression model specified previously, which includes the primary 
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independent variable AF and the other control variables to check other possible 
affecting factors, is performed. The OLS estimation of coefficient λ1 is of primary 
interest. A positive and significant 1λ  supports the alternative hypothesis that poor 
audit quality is associated with high levels of earnings management measured by 
discretionary accruals and controlling for other influential factors.  
 
3.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
     Management has the incentive to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts because 
failure to meet earnings forecasts provides a negative signal to the market. As 
stated in the previous section, auditors should prevent all material misstatements of 
financial statements, including earnings management. Management has an 
incentive to manipulate earnings if actual earnings do not meet earnings forecasts. 
If an auditor performs high-quality audits, the clients’ ability to engage in earnings 
management will be limited. More specifically, clients would have more difficulty 
meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts when audit quality is high. Therefore, the 
absolute value of the difference between reported earnings and analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (earnings forecast errors) should be negatively related to audit quality. 
 
3.3.3.1 Model Specification 
     Consistent with Davis et al. (2000), an OLS regression model is used to test H3. 
The OLS regression model is expressed as follows: 
ititititititit STDNLAGLGTAAFFE εθθθθθθ ++++++= 543210  
                                                                                                  (Equation 3.4) 
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     where: 
itFE     = analysts’ earnings forecast error, measured as the absolute value of 
the difference between actual reported earnings and analysts’ consensus 
forecast earnings; 
 
itAF     = dummy variable of audit failure taking value 1 if company i is 
from the audit failure group, 0 otherwise; 
 
itLGTA  = natural logarithm of total assets; 
itLAG    = number of days between most recent earnings forecasts and fiscal 
year end; 
 
itN       = number of analysts’ forecasts included in consensus forecasts 
itSTD   = variation of analysts’ forecasts, measured as standard deviation of  
earnings forecasts made for company i; 
 
0θ        = the intercept of the regression model; 
 
521 ,..., θθθ = the coefficients of the regression model; 
 
itε        = random error term with mean 0 and variation 1. 
     To control for the size effect on analysts’ forecast errors, the natural logarithm 
of total assets is included as an independent variable. Prior research suggests that 
the closer analysts’ forecasts are to the earnings number announced, the smaller the 
forecast error (Davis et al., 2000; O’Brien, 1988). Therefore, a control variable 
LAG, which measures the number of days between the most recent earnings 
forecasts and the fiscal year end, is included. Consistent with prior literature (Davis 
et al., 2000; Lys and Soo, 1995), the number of analysts’ forecasts included in 
consensus earnings forecasts and forecast dispersion also are included as control 
variables to control for cross-sectional differences in the information environment 
that may explain variation in forecast accuracy. 
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3.3.3.2 Testing of Hypothesis 3 
     As a first step in testing H3, the means of analysts’ forecast errors for the audit 
failure and non-audit failure groups are compared using a t-test and a non-
parametric Wilcoxon test. Significant lower mean analysts’ forecast errors for the 
audit failure group compared with those of the matched control group would 
support the alternative hypothesis that poor actual audit quality may be associated 
with lower levels of analysts’ forecast errors. The OLS regression model specified 
earlier, which includes both the variable, AF, and several control variables, is 
performed. The primary interest is the coefficient on AF, θ1. A negative and 
significant value for θ1 indicates that poor audit quality is associated with lower 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
     This chapter described sample selection procedure, and presented models and 
methods used to test the hypotheses. Dependent and independent variables 
contained in the models also were described and discussed. The next chapter 
presents and discusses the results of the data analyses. 
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CHATPER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
    This chapter describes the data analysis and presents results of testing the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. The following section provides an overview of 
sample characteristics. The next three sections show the data analysis and results 
for the hypothesis testing. 
 
4.2 Sample Characteristics 
 
    As stated in Chapter 3, the apparent audit failure cases considered in this study 
were identified by reviewing the SEC’s AAERs and by searching news reports of 
financial statement restatements and litigation against auditors. The Palmrose 
(1999) auditor litigation database also was searched. From the above data sources, I 
identified 683 companies that materially misstated their annual financial statements 
within the period from 1980 to 2000. As this study defines apparent audit failures 
as cases in which auditors provide unqualified opinions on financial statements that 
contain material misstatements, a search of the COMPUSTAT database
8
 for those 
companies receiving unqualified opinions was performed. Of the 683 companies, 
442 companies (848 firm/years) have audit opinion information available for the 
specified financial statements years. Twenty-six companies (69 firm/years) were 
deleted because auditors issued qualified opinions to those companies. Therefore, 
416 companies (779 firm/years) are included as apparent audit failures.   
                                                 
8
 COMPUSTAT data item 149 provides both auditor and audit opinion information. However, it 
does not provide reasons why the qualified audit opinions were issued. 
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    The sample for this study was reduced further because of absence of other data 
required to test specific hypotheses. In order to test H1, earnings per share, book 
value of stockholders’ equity, and stock price data must be available from 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. For testing H2, all variables specified in the 
Modified Jones Model, presented in Chapter 3, must be available from 
COMPUSTAT in order to estimate discretionary accruals. Testing H3 requires 
analysts’ earnings forecast data from IBES. Given these considerations, the 
resulting sample of apparent audit failures for testing each hypothesis is as follows: 
346 companies (616 firm/years) for testing H1, 194 companies (313 firm/years) for 
testing H2, and 123 companies (208 firm/years) for testing H3. See Table 1 for 
sample size and industry distribution information. Given the matched pairs-design 
used in this study, each audit failure company in the sample is matched with a 
control company based on year of misstated financial statements, industry, 
company size, and auditor type.
9
 
 
4.3 Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
4.3.1 Overview 
 
    Prior accounting research frequently has used a model’s R
2
 statistic
 
to measure 
value-relevance of accounting information (e.g., Lang et al., 2003; Sami and Zhou, 
2002; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Nwaeze, 1998; Collins et al., 1997; Amir and 
Lev, 1996; Harris et al., 1994.). These studies have measured value-relevance as 
the R
2
 resulting from the regressions of stock prices on per share values of earnings 
                                                 
9
 Companies receiving qualified opinions are excluded from the matched pairs control group as 
well. 
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and book values of equity. These studies compare value-relevance measured by R
2
 
either over different time periods or across different samples. In this study, R
2
s are 
compared across audit failure and non-audit failure groups to investigate whether 
the market assesses audit quality appropriately. Except in Harris et al. (1994), Lang 
et al. (2003), and Sami and Zhou (2002), value-relevance studies have not included 
a formal test for the difference of R
2
s.  For example, Collins et al. (1997) perform 
regressions based on the Ohlson (1995) model for different time periods which 
yield adjusted R
2
s for those periods, they then regress adjusted R
2
 on time period t. 
They conclude that the value relevance of earnings and book values has not 
declined over this period since they do not find a significant negative relationship 
between adjusted R
2
s and the time period. Francis and Schipper (1999) adopted the 
same method to test whether the explanatory power of earnings for market-adjusted 
returns changes over time.  
    Sami and Zhou (2002) compare R
2
s of two different samples using the Vuong 
test. However, the Vuong test is designed to compare R
2
s of two models with the 
same dependent variable but different independent variables, and thus is not 
applicable to value relevance studies using the same independent variables for each 
model. Harris et al. (1994) and Lang et al. (2003) utilize the procedure 
demonstrated in Cramer (1987) to get the mean and variance of R
2
s. They then 
conduct a z-test to compare the means of two R
2
s. A problem with applying the 
Cramer method in this context is that it depends on the assumption that R
2 
is 
normal (we note that this is not a problem if the sample size for the regression is 
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large).  However, it is not normal. Under the null that the population R
2
 ≠0, the 
density of R
2
 (Anderson 2003) is:  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )12
1
23
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
−−−
−



 −Γ


 +−Γ
−




Γ
pnp
n
RR
ppn
Rn
 
( ) ,;1
2
1
;
2
1
,
2
1 22



 −• RRpnnF  (Equation 4.1) 
where F is the hypergeometric function expressed as following: 
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n is the number of observations; 
p-1 is the number of independent variables.  
Therefore, under the null that R
2
 is not zero, the distribution of R
2
 is F distribution 
with p-1 and n-p degrees of freedom. Because of the obvious difficulty in applying 
the Cramer (1987) procedure, it is not widely used-value in relevance research in 
accounting.  
    Because of the difficulty and possible unreliability
10
 of using the Cramer 
procedure, this study uses the bootstrap method to create tests for the difference in 
R
2
s. Bootstrapping is a resampling method that requires fewer assumptions than 
traditional methods and generally provides more accurate results. For example, the 
bootstrap method does not require normality of the distribution of the R
2
 and it 
provides a faster convergence to the true value of the R
2
.  
                                                 
10
 One source of unreliability is computer operational overflow problems discussed in 3.4. 
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    The following section presents descriptive statistics for the sample used to test 
H1. Next, the results of testing H1 using the Cramer (1987) procedure, following 
Harris et al. (1994) and Lang et al. (2003), which entails comparing confidence 
intervals of R
2
s using the mean and standard deviation of R
2
s, are presented. That is 
followed by an analysis implementing the bootstrap method. The testing of H1 
concludes with a summary of the results of the two testing approaches. 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
    The sample selection procedure yielded 616 firm/year observations of apparent 
audit failures, which were matched with a control group in order to perform the 
comparisons required to test H1. In the audit failure group, 502 (114) firm/years 
were audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors (non-Big 8/6/5 auditors). See Table 2 for the 
observations included in each comparison.
11
 
    Table 3 presents descriptive statistics, including the mean, median, and standard 
deviation for total assets (TA), stock prices (P), earnings per share (EPS), and book 
value of equity per share (BVPS) for both groups in each comparison. Table 3 also 
includes a comparison of the means for each of these variables. Since the 
distributions of these variables might not be normal, both a two-sample t-test and a 
nonparametric Wilcoxon test are conducted. In general, the audit failure group and 
matched control group are not significantly different in total assets, which reflects a 
successful control in company size. As larger companies tend to have Big 8/6/5 
auditors, comparison 4 shows that the average company size of the audit failure 
                                                 
11
 Note that in comparison 4 in Table 2, 39 of the 502 audit failure cases were dropped due to 
inability to match these firm/years with those of a non-Big 8/6/5 control group. 
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group is significantly larger than that of the matched control group. In comparison 
5, the Wilcoxon test results in a significant difference in company size, while the 
two-sample t-test does not indicate a significant difference. The control companies 
also appear to have better performance compared with audit failure companies. 
With the exception of comparison 3, the matched control groups have a higher EPS 
than the audit failure group. 
 
 
4.3.3 Testing H1 Using Cramer (1987) Procedure 
 
4.3.3.1 Description of Cramer (1987) Procedure 
 
    The purpose of this section is to describe the Cramer (1987) procedure in detail. 
Harris et al. (1994) and Lang et al. (2003) use a z-test for the difference in R
2
s in 
two samples. A two-sample z-statistic is calculated as: 
2
2
2
1
2
1
21
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s
n
s
xx
z
+
−
=                                                                           (Equation 4.2) 
where: 
1x  and 2x are the means 
1x  
2
1s and 
2
2s are the variances; 
                  1n  and 2n are the numbers of observations in each sample. 
    As shown above, in order to conduct a z-test, one must obtain the means and 
variances of R
2
s for the two samples. Cramer (1987) provides a procedure to 
calculate the mean (the first moment) and second moment of R
2
. If the mean of R
2
 
is expressed as E(R
2
), the second moment is E(R
2
)
2
 and the variance of R
2
 is the 
second moment minus the mean. The second moment can then be used to calculate 
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the variance. Under the Cramer procedure, if k-1 is the number of independent 
variables, m is the number of observations, X is an m×k-1 matrix of observations of 
independent variables and β is k-1 vector of coefficients: 
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    To apply the Cramer procedure, the following three steps are performed.  
Step One—Determine u and v: 
Based on equations (4.6) and (4.7), u and v are determined by the number of 
independent variables and the number of observations, respectively.  
Step Two—Determine φ  and λ: 
The termφ  is determined through the matrix calculation specified in 
equation(4.9). The β is a k-1 vector of coefficients estimated from the OLS 
  
52
 
regression; σ
2
 is the estimated error variance of the regression model. To get φ , 
one should set the regression model to be in a form where the intercept is zero. 
After determining φ , λ is calculated according to equation (4.8). 
Step Three—Calculate the first and second moment of R
2
: 
To get the first and the second moment of R
2
, an index j is used to calculate 
w(j) according to equation (4.5). We start to calculate E(R
2
) and E(R
2
)
2
 based 
on equations (4.3) and (4.4) when j=0 and then increase j until the values of 
E(R
2
) and E(R
2
)
2
 are stable and do not change with respect to an increase in j. 
Obviously, if w(j) approaches zero, E(R
2
) and E(R
2
)
2
 become stable. For 
example, if we continue incrementing j and find that when j reaches 50 and 
higher, E(R
2
) is always 0.1 and E(R
2
)
2
 is always 0.15, then the mean of R
2
 is 
0.01 and the second moment of R
2
 is 0.15. After the first moment and the 
second moment of R
2
 have been determined, the variance of R
2
, VAR(R
2
), can 
be calculated using the following equation: 
( ) ( ) ( )2222 RERERV −=                                                (Equation 4.10) 
 
4.3.3.2 Cramer z-test 
 
    Once we have the mean and variance of R
2
, we can calculate the z-statistic as in 
Harris et al. (1994) and Lang et al. (2003) and compare means of R
2
s across two 
samples. The expression of equation (4.2) can be modified as follows since the 
number of observations of R
2
 is only one for each sample: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )2221
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 Z-test results are presented in Table 4, along with φ ,λ , mean(R2), and stddev(R2), 
all computed using the Cramer procedure.  
    As described in Chapter 3, five comparisons are made in order to see whether 
auditor type (Big 8/6/5 vs. non-Big 8/6/5) may have an effect on the market’s 
ability to evaluate actual audit quality. In general, these results using the Cramer 
procedure suggest that there is a significant difference in R
2
s for the audit failure 
group and the matched control group. Z-tests in all but comparison 5 show 
significant differences in the R
2
s. Inconsistent with my expectation, the matched 
control group in comparison 5 has a relatively low R
2
. Since this is a non-failure 
group audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors, I expected that its R
2
 would be no lower than 
those of other matched control groups. However, the standard deviation of R
2
 for 
this group is quite large compared with all other groups. A large standard deviation 
causes the z-test to be insignificant. One possible reason for this result is that the 
financial performance of this group of companies tends to be poor because this 
group contains some of the smallest publicly held companies that are audited by 
Big 8/6/5 auditors. Another interesting finding is that the failure group audited by 
non-Big 8/6/5 auditors has the lowest R
2
 compared with all other failure groups and 
non-failure groups. This suggests that the market has little confidence in the 
relevance of accounting information for these companies.  
 
4.3.3.3 Cramer Confidence Intervals 
 
    In this unique setting, it is preferable to test H1 by comparing confidence 
intervals. When confidence intervals do not overlap, we can conclude that R
2
s are 
significantly different. In applying the two-interval test, one important issue is to 
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determine the length of confidence intervals. Nelson (1989) shows that using 95% 
confidence intervals can greatly understate the significance of the test. In other 
words, the test would be too conservative if 95% confidence intervals were used 
when we required α to be 0.05. Since this study uses the conventional 0.05 as α, the 
length of the confidence intervals should be 83.4%.
12
 
    The 83.4% confidence intervals using the mean and standard deviation 
calculated from the Cramer procedure are illustrated in Table 5. Consistent with z-
tests in the prior section, 83.4% confidence intervals do not overlap, with the 
exception of comparison 5. The confidence interval of the R
2
 for the matched 
control group in comparison 5 is very wide because of the large standard deviation 
of R
2
. 
 
4.3.3.4 Special Problems with Cramer Procedure 
 
    As shown earlier, the Cramer procedure is complicated to apply, which may 
explain why it is not commonly adopted by accounting researchers. However, 
researchers also may encounter problems caused by computer operation overflows.  
Computer operation overflows occur when a number is larger than the largest 
number that can be represented by a computer. All computers produce “incorrect” 
answers because of the lack of an infinite word length to store numbers 
                                                 
12
 Barr (1969) illustrates that the length of the confidence intervals for the two-interval test must be 
constructed with the multiplier 975.0
21
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+
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(McCullough and Vinod, 1999). Sometimes researchers are not even aware that 
they are using wrong numbers produced by computers. 
    As illustrated earlier, w(j) needs to be calculated according to equation (4.4) in 
order to get the mean and the variance of R
2
. The factor that determines w(j) is λ , 
which is a function of sample size m, the number of independent variables k-1, and 
R
2
 from the regression. Theλ is large when sample size or/and the R2 from the 
regression is/are large. Whenλ  is large, we need a large j to get the values of the 
mean and the second moment of R
2
. In this case, the numerator component jλ  in 
w(j) may become a value that is even larger than the largest number a computer can 
represent. If expression of w(j) is not changed to avoid computer operation 
overflows, either no results or unreliable results would be abtained.   
    When calculating the mean and the second moment of R
2
 for the matched control 
group, initial results were incorrect because of computer operation overflows. 
Because R
2
 (0.4179) of the regression is relatively large and the sample size (616) 
is not small, the value ofλ , which is 441, is also large. Therefore, the value j needs 
to be large enough to get stable values of E(R
2
) and E(R
2
)
2
. Using the original 
expression specified in equation (4.4), the computer output of E(R
2
) appears to be 
“Inf”, that is, infinitely large. The computer is not able to give a valid value for w(j) 
simply because the numerator component jλ was too large. Therefore, the 
expression of equation (4.4)was changed to ( )
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 to mitigate the 
problem. With this calculation, the mean of R
2
 appeared to be 0.00718. Although it 
was a valid number, the value of the mean of R
2
 was not accurate because the mean 
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of R
2
 should converge to the R
2
 from above. In other words, the mean of R
2
 should 
be very close to but larger than the R
2
, which is 0.4179. If one fails to scrutinize the 
value of the mean of R
2
, an incorrect value might be falsely assumed to be correct. 
This incorrect result indicated that the algorithm was insufficient. With infinity in 
the denominator of equation (4.2), beyond some j, all of the terms became zero 
instead of positive numbers and the resulting E(R
2
) was too small.  
    The results presented in Tables 4 and 5 were obtained by using an expression 
that is not subject to the computer operation overflow problem, by changing w(j) 
specified in equation (4.4) to the following expression: 
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Although the operation overflow problem can be overcome by changing the 
expression of w(j), users of the Cramer procedure must exercise caution. If one is 
not aware of this problem and does not change the expression into equation (4.12), 
results may not be obtained or the results obtained may be incorrect.  
 
4.3.4 Testing H1 Using Bootstrap Confidence Intervals 
 
4.3.4.1 Introduction of Bootstrap Methods 
 
    A superior alternative to the Cramer procedure is bootstrapping, a resampling 
procedure that requires fewer assumptions compared with traditional methods. For 
example, bootstrap methods do not require the distributions to be normal or the 
sample size to be large. For small sample sizes and nonlinear models, bootstrap 
methods can be superior to classical methods. Moreover, bootstrap methods are 
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straightforward and do not cause computer operation overflows. Although 
bootstrap methods have not been widely used in accounting research, a few studies 
have implemented this technique in their statistical analysis (e.g., Burgstahler et al., 
2002; Core and Guay, 2002; Liu et al., 2002; Willis, 2001.) 
    For the purpose of the current study, I created 1,000 bootstrap resamples by 
sampling with replacement from each of the original samples. Each bootstrap 
resample is the same size as the original sample.
13
 For each bootstrap resample, 
there is one R
2
 generated from the bootstrap regression, which is called R
2*
. 
Therefore, the 1,000 bootstrap resamples generated 1,000 R
2*
s.  
 
4.3.4.2 Bootstrap Percentile Confidence Intervals 
 
To test whether R
2
s of the audit failure group and the matched control group differ, 
we can compare the 83.4% bootstrap percentile confidence intervals of R
2
s. Figures 
1-5 presents the histograms and Q-Q plots in order to provide information about the 
distribution of R
2
 based on bootstrap resamples. The histograms and Q-Q plots of 
R
2*
s for the majority of the comparisons indicate normal or approximately normal 
distributions. However, there are three exceptions. Two of the exceptions are the 
distributions of R
2
s for the audit failure groups audited by non-Big 8/6/5 auditors in 
comparison 3 and comparison 5, which exhibit an asymmetric pattern because most 
R
2
s from the bootstrap resamples are quite small and very close to zero. Since R
2
s 
are non-negative values, these distributions cannot be symmetric. The third 
exception appears in comparison 5, where R
2
s for the matched control group 
                                                 
13
 For example, for the original sample size of 616 firm/years, the bootstrap resamples also will 
contain 616 observations, but will not be identical to the set of observations in the original sample. 
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audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors appear to have a bimodal distribution, a probability 
distribution characterized by two peaks or humps rather than the more common 
single peak that characterizes the normal distribution. One peak is at around 0.15 
and the other peak is at around 0.46. This illustrates why the standard deviation of 
R
2
 for this group is so large. A possible reason for this phenomenon is that some 
companies in this group may have some other characteristics that cause the market 
to discount the value-relevance of their accounting information. When the 
distribution of R
2
 is not normal, the Cramer procedure would not provide accurate 
results since it requires normality of R
2
. However, without performing the bootstrap 
method, this deficiency in the results of the Cramer procedure would not be 
apparent. 
    As stated earlier, one advantage of bootstrap methods is that they do not require 
distributions to be normal. To create 83.4% bootstrap percentile confidence 
intervals, the 1,000 R
2*
s from bootstrap regressions were sorted in ascending order. 
The lower value of the confidence interval is the 83
rd
 (0.083*1000) R
2*
 and the 
upper value is the 917
th
 (0.917*1000) R
2*
. The results of the bootstrap percentile 
confidence intervals are shown in Table 6. In general and consistent with results 
using the Cramer procedure, comparisons of bootstrap percentile confidence 
intervals indicate significant differences in R
2
s for the audit failure group and the 
matched control group. Except for comparison 5, confidence intervals do not 
overlap. In comparison 5, the confidence interval for the matched non-failure group 
is very wide because of the bimodal distribution of R
2
. 
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4.3.4.3 Bootstrap Percentile t Confidence Intervals 
 
    In addition to considering the bootstrap percentile confidence intervals for R
2
s, 
this study also presents bootstrap percentile t confidence intervals since they 
converge on the true R
2
 value faster than percentile confidence intervals and may 
provide more accurate results. A bootstrap percentile t confidence interval is a 
confidence interval based on the t statistic of R
2
 from each bootstrap resample. The 
standard deviation of R
2*
s is computed using the Cramer (1987) procedure. Then a 
t-statistic for each R
2*
 is calculated based on the following equation:  
( )*2
2*2
*
i
i
i
Rstddev
RR
t
−
=                                (Equation 4.13) 
where: 
i is the ith bootstrap resample; 
2R is R
2
 from the regression using the original sample; 
*2
iR is R
2
 from the ith bootstrap regression; and, 
( )*2iRstddev  is the standard deviation of R2 from the ith bootstrap regression 
using the Cramer procedure. 
    Before considering the results for the bootstrap percentile t confidence intervals, 
the distribution of t
*
s must be examined by looking at histograms and Q-Q plots for 
the five comparisons. See Figures 1-5 for histograms and Q-Q plots for t
*
 
distributions for each comparison. Computing the t-statistic is a procedure of 
standardizing R
2
s based on the bootstrap resamples. If the distribution of R
2
 is 
initially normal or near normal, the distribution of t
*
s should be standard normal or 
near standard normal. Except for the failure group audited by non-Big 8/6/5 
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auditors and the matched control group audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors in comparison 
5, the histograms and Q-Q plots suggest standard normal or approximately standard 
normal distributions with the mean zero or near zero. Since the distribution of R
2
s 
for the matched control group in comparison 5 is bimodal, distribution of t
*
s is also 
bimodal after removing some extreme values.  
    To create 83.4% bootstrap percentile t confidence intervals, 1,000 t
*
s from 
bootstrap resamples are sorted in ascending order. The 83rd and 917
th
 t
*
s are used 
to calculate the lower and upper values of the interval based on the following 
equations: 
( ) *91722 tRstddevRvaluelower •−=                   (Equation 4.14a) 
( ) *8322 tRstddevRvalueupper •−=                    (Equation 4.14b) 
The bootstrap percentile t confidence intervals are shown in Table 7. In general, 
with the exception of comparison 5, these results also suggest significant 
differences in R
2
s between the audit failure group and the matched control group.  
 
4.3.5 Summary 
 
    In this study, both the Cramer procedure and the bootstrap method are used to 
create formal tests for differences in R
2
s across samples. In general, the results 
suggest that the value relevance of earnings and book values of equity is lower for 
companies experiencing apparent audit failures than for companies that have not 
experienced apparent audit failures. Although the market may exhibit less 
confidence in accounting information from companies audited by non-Big 8/6/5 
auditors, the results provide evidence that the market generally exhibits less 
  
61
 
confidence in companies experiencing audit failure, regardless of their auditors’ 
size. These results provide support for H1 that the explanatory power of accounting 
information of companies experiencing apparent auditor failures is lower than that 
of companies that have not experienced apparent auditor failures. 
      
4.4 Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
    The following section provides descriptive statistics for the sample selected for 
testing H2. Next, the testing results are presented. 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Table 8 reports descriptive statistics for the 313 companies experiencing 
apparent audit failures and the matched control group used to test H2. Based on the 
two-sample t-tests, there are no significant differences between the audit failure 
group and the matched control group in company size (TA), discretionary accruals 
(DAC), the market to book ratio (MTB), leverage (LEV), and operating cash flows 
(OCF). The only significant difference between the two groups is the absolute 
value of total accruals (ABTAC). However, the validity of the t-test depends on the 
assumption of normal distributions of the variables being compared. Therefore, the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon two-sample test results also are provided. Wilcoxon tests 
show significant differences in LEV, OCF, and ABTAC between the two groups. 
 
 
4.4.2 Testing Results 
 
     To test H2, the means of DAC for the audit failure group are compared with the 
matched control group. The two-sample t-test does not show a statistical difference 
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between the two groups. However, the distribution of DAC appears to be highly 
skewed as the mean is far greater than the median for both groups. Given this 
violation of the normality assumption, the nonparametric Wilcoxon two-sample test 
provides a more reliable indication of the difference between the groups. I find a 
significant difference in discretionary accruals (DAC) based on the Wilcoxon test. 
Consistent with H2, the audit failure group in general shows a higher level of DAC 
(0.632667) compared with the matched control group (0.590241).  
    To confirm this result, the regression model proposed in Chapter 3 is used to test 
H2. Table 9 reports Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) 
correlation coefficients among all variables included in testing H2. All significant 
correlations are bold. Although the Pearson correlation between the dummy 
variable and DAC is insignificant, the Spearman correlation is significantly positive 
indicating higher discretionary accruals for the audit failure group. The Spearman 
correlation should provide a more accurate result in this case since the distribution 
of DAC is not normal. The Pearson correlation is reliable only when the normal 
distribution assumption is valid.  
    Based on the regression results reported in Table 10, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable AF is positive but insignificant. One possible reason for this 
insignificance might be the relatively low power of the Modified Jones Model in 
detecting earnings management. Prior literature suggests that the power of 
discretionary models in detecting earnings management is low.  
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4.4.3 Summary  
 
    In order to test whether apparent audit failures are associated with higher levels 
of earnings management, the means of DAC of the audit failure group and the 
matched control group are compared. Due to violations of the underlying 
assumptions of linear regression, the specified regression model did not yield 
persuasive evidence for accepting H2. However, the nonparametric Wilcoxon two-
sample test suggests that the audit failure group exhibits a higher level of 
discretionary accruals compared with the matched control group. This finding 
provides support for H2, that companies experiencing apparent audit failures 
exhibit higher levels of earnings management.  
 
4.5 Testing Hypothesis 3 
 
    This section provides descriptive statistics for the sample selected for testing H3, 
followed by the results of testing H3. 
 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
    There are 123 audit failure companies with required analysts’ forecast data 
available on IBES. These companies yield a total of 208 firm/year observations. Of 
the 208 observations, only one firm/year is audited by a non-Big 8/6/5 auditor.  
This is consistent with analysts tending to follow only large companies, which in 
turn are more likely to be audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors. Descriptive statistics for 
the audit failure group and the matched control group are reported in Table 11. 
Two-sample t-tests do not show any significant differences between the audit 
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failure group and the matched control group in total assets (TA), EPS, median 
analysts’ forecasted earnings (FCEPS), analysts’ forecast errors
14
 (FE), the number 
of forecasts, dispersion of forecasts (STD), and the lag between forecast dates and 
fiscal year end (LAG). The nonparametric Wilcoxon test shows significant 
difference in EPS and FCEPS between the two groups. Surprisingly, the forecasted 
earnings of audit failure companies are higher compared with the control 
companies, while their actual reported earnings are lower.  
 
4.5.2 Testing Results 
 
    To test H3, the means of FE are compared between the audit failure group and 
the matched control group. As developed in Chapter 2, H3 presents an expectation 
that the audit failure group would have a lower level of FE. Although the mean of 
FE for the audit failure group (0.9959615) is lower than the mean of FE for the 
matched control group (1.959375), the difference is not statistically significant 
based on either the two-sample t-test or the Wilcoxon test. As indicated by the 
Wilcoxon test, the forecasted earnings for the audit failure group is statistically 
higher compared with the matched control group. This systematic difference may 
reduce the ability of this comparison to find a significantly lower FE for the audit 
failure group. If analysts’ forecasted earnings of the audit failure group are biased 
upward to a greater extent relative to the matched control group, it would be more 
difficult for the failure group to meet forecasted earnings and to minimize the 
difference between reported and forecasted earnings. Furthermore, the audit failure 
                                                 
14
 Analysts’ forecast errors are calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the median 
analysts’ forecasted EPS and the actual reported EPS. 
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group exhibits a higher level of leverage compared with the matched control group. 
This may suggest that companies in the audit failure group are more likely to be 
financially distressed. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Becker et al., 1998), the 
results of testing H2 may indicate that leverage reduces the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals because auditors may perceive higher risk and respond by 
making more conservative audit judgments for such companies. Therefore, the 
ability of companies in the audit failure group to manage earnings to meet analysts’ 
earnings forecasts might be limited. 
     Table 12 provides Pearson and Spearman correlations. There are no significant 
correlations between AF and all other control variables. Consistent with the result 
the comparison of the means of FE, the regression analysis does not show a 
significantly negative relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and AF
15
 (see 
regression results in Table 13).
16
 Because the forecasted earnings for the audit 
failure group are higher than the matched control group, while the audit failure 
group’s earnings are lower, it is relatively more difficult for audit failure companies 
to meet analysts’ forecasts. Such difficulty may be causing analysts’ forecast errors 
to be large. 
 
4.5.3 Summary 
 
    Based on the results of this testing, analysts’ forecast errors for the audit failure 
group are not significantly different from those of the matched control group. 
                                                 
15
 Mean analysts’ analysts’ forecast yield similar results. 
16
 To ensure that these results are not driven by differences in EPS between the two groups, this 
analysis was also performed using total earnings and forecasted earnings. Similar results were 
obtained. 
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Therefore, H3, that companies experiencing apparent audit failures exhibit lower 
levels of analysts’ forecast errors than companies that have not experienced 
apparent audit failures, is not supported by these results. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Overview 
 
    This chapter provides a summary of the current study. The following sections 
present the conclusions of testing results, limitations of the study, and contributions 
as well as implications for future research. 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 
    The findings for the three hypotheses tested in this study are summarized in this 
section. 
 
5.2.1 Perceived Audit Quality and Actual Audit Quality 
 
    This study first examines whether market-perceived audit quality captures actual 
audit quality as measured by apparent audit failures. This study uses the value-
relevance of accounting information as the measure for market-perceived audit 
quality. Companies experiencing an apparent audit failure are matched with similar 
companies not experiencing an apparent audit failure. Then, comparisons are made 
between the audit failure group and a matched-control group. In general, 
accounting information is less value-relevant for the audit failure group than for the 
matched control group.
17
  
    In comparison 1, the result shows that the value-relevance of accounting 
information for all audit failure companies is lower than for matched control 
companies. In comparisons 2 and 3, comparisons are made between audit failure 
                                                 
17
 That is, accounting information explains significantly less of the variation in stock price for 
companies experiencing apparent audit failures. 
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groups and matched control groups within the same auditor types. Results show 
that the value-relevance of accounting information for audit failure companies 
audited by Big 8/6/5 (non-Big 8/6/5 auditors) is less than for the matched non-audit 
failure companies audited by Big 8/6/5 (non-Big 8/6/5) auditors.  Therefore, the 
market appears to differentiate between companies with audit quality differences. 
Moreover, in comparison 4, accounting information provided by companies 
experiencing audit failures and audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors is less value-relevant 
compared with companies that have not experienced audit failures and are audited 
by non-Big 8/6/5 auditors. This result suggests that the market’s ability to evaluate 
audit quality is not affected by perceived audit quality as proxied by auditor size. 
Thus, as illustrated in comparisons 1 through 4, the results indicate that the market 
appears to assess actual audit quality accurately.  
    However, inconsistent with my expectation, comparison 5 does not show any 
difference in the value-relevance of accounting information between the audit 
failure companies audited by non-Big 8/6/5 auditors and the matched control 
companies audited by Big 8/6/5 auditors.  As indicated in Chapter 4, the 
insignificant difference in value-relevance between the two groups in comparison 5 
is most likely attributable to the special sample characteristics of the matched 
control group.  
  
5.2.2 Actual Audit Quality and Earnings Management 
 
    This study also examines the association between actual audit quality and 
earnings management. Following prior studies, earnings management is measured 
  
69
 
by discretionary accruals estimated using the Cross-Sectional Modified Jones 
Model. Based on a nonparametric two-sample test, the audit failure group shows 
higher discretionary accruals than the matched control group.  This result provides 
support for the hypothesis that poor actual audit quality is related to a higher level 
of earnings management confirming prior research which finds significant 
association between perceived quality and earnings management (e.g., Becker et 
al., 1998). Companies experiencing audit failure appear to engage in earnings 
management to a significantly greater extent than companies not experiencing audit 
failure. The result suggests that discretionary accrual measures might be suitable 
proxies for audit quality as such accruals are significantly associated with actual 
audit quality.   
 
5.2.3 Actual Audit Quality and Financial Analysts’ Forecast Errors 
 
    Since the objective of managing earnings may be to meet analyst’s earnings 
forecasts, this study also investigates whether actual audit quality is related to 
analysts’ forecast errors. The results of this study do not reveal any statistically 
significant relationship between actual audit quality and financial analysts’ forecast 
errors. There are some possible reasons for the insignificant result. First, analysts’ 
forecasted earnings might have more upward bias for the audit failure group than 
for the matched control group, which makes it more difficult for the audit failure 
group to meet earnings targets. It is possible that companies experiencing apparent 
audit failures have attempted to influence analysts’ earnings forecasts to bias 
forecasted earnings upward. This upward bias would tend to drive up stock prices. 
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This would allow insiders aware of accounting problems to sell stock at higher 
prices. 
    Second, on average, the audit failure group exhibits a higher level of leverage 
compared with the matched control group. This may indicate that companies in the 
audit failure group are more likely to be financially distressed. Therefore, the main 
purpose for engaging in earnings management may be to avoid debt covenants and 
being forced into bankruptcy. Thus, the necessity to mislead creditors may take 
precedence over attempting to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. As 
previous research and the results of this study indicate, leverage reduces the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals because auditors may perceive greater risk and 
may exercise more scrutiny for clients with higher leverage, implying that auditors 
tend to constrain earnings management more effectively in more highly leveraged 
clients. Thus, auditors may be relatively successful in limiting the audit failure 
companies’ ability to manage earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts. 
 
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
    The conclusions of this study are subject to several limitations. First, although a 
search for apparent audit failures was conducted using AAERs, news of 
restatements, and news of litigation against auditors, the sample may not include all 
cases of apparent audit failure. Moreover, there also might be unobserved audit 
failures in addition to the apparent audit failures included from these three sources. 
However, this limitation would reduce the likelihood of finding significant results. 
Specifically, if some audit failures are not included in the audit failure sample in 
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this study and instead are included in the matched control group, hypothesis testing 
would have less power to find significant differences between the two groups. 
    Second, in testing Hypothesis 1 using comparison 5, audit failure companies 
audited by non-Big 8/6/5 auditors are compared with matched companies audited 
by Big 8/6/5 auditors. However, the result does not show any difference in value-
relevance between the audit failure group and the matched control group, which is 
not consistent with prior research employing the size proxy or with the expectation 
of this study. The comparison of companies experiencing apparent audit failures 
and audited by non-Big 8/6/5 auditors with non-audit failure companies audited by 
Big 8/6/5 auditors should have shown a difference in value-relevance of accounting 
information between the two groups. The insignificant result may be caused by 
some unusual sample characteristics of the matched control group. If this is the 
case, some other characteristics, such as company performance, may be a more 
relevant basis for comparison. 
    Finally, the sample used in testing the relationship between actual audit quality 
and financial analysts’ forecast errors may not be representative of all companies. 
Only relatively large companies were included in the sample; many small 
companies were dropped from the sample because earnings forecast data are not 
available for them. Therefore, these results may not hold for smaller companies.  
 
5.4 Contributions and Implications for Future Research 
 
    This study has several implications for audit quality research. The results of this 
study suggest that market-perceived audit quality, which is measured by value-
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relevance of accounting information, captures actual audit quality. When there is a 
lack of an actual audit quality proxy such as subsequent recognition of audit 
failures, accounting researchers may have confidence in relying on a market-
perceived audit quality proxy. For example, value-relevance of accounting 
information can be considered as a measure of actual audit quality for a group of 
companies in testing whether certain factors affect audit quality. Also, consistent 
with prior research, discretionary accruals can be considered as an alternative 
measure of actual audit quality since companies experiencing apparent audit 
failures exhibit on average relatively high levels of discretionary accruals. The 
findings of this study suggest that companies experiencing apparent audit failures 
exhibit higher levels of earnings management compared with companies that have 
not experienced apparent audit failures. Accordingly, this study validates prior 
audit quality research (e.g., Becker et al., 1998) that has found a relationship 
between earnings management and perceived audit quality measures (i.e., auditor 
size). 
    This study, by applying the bootstrap method for testing differences in R
2
s and 
by providing a detailed exposition of this method, also contributes to value-
relevance research that measures model explanatory power. The bootstrap method 
requires fewer assumptions and provides more accurate results compared with 
traditional testing methods. Furthermore, this study demonstrates in detail how to 
apply the Cramer procedure to obtain the mean and standard deviation of R
2
. The 
testing methods adopted in this study have implications for future value-relevance 
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accounting research because they provide alternative formal tests for the difference 
in R
2
s.     
    Although this study expected that the objective of earnings management in 
companies experiencing audit failures would be to meet analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, analysts’ forecast errors for those companies are not significantly smaller 
than for companies that have not experienced audit failures.  These results indicate 
that managers of audit failure companies may have some other incentives for 
managing earnings. For example, earnings management may be directed toward 
avoiding debt covenant violations. Future research could investigate whether other 
factors, such as board and financial characteristics, may have an effect on earnings 
management.          
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Size and Industry Distribution 
 
Panel A: Apparent Audit Failure Cases Included to Test H1 
Audit failure cases:                                     416 companies         779 firm/years 
Less: observations without price data:         70 companies        163  firm/years 
Sample for testing H1:                               346 companies        616 firm/years 
 
Industry SIC Code Number of Observations Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  01-09 1 0.29% 
Mining 10-14 15 4.34% 
Construction 15-17 7 2.02% 
Manufacturing 20-39 127 36.71% 
Transportation & Public Utilities 40-49 31 8.96% 
Wholesale Trade 50-51 12 3.47% 
Retail Trade 52-59 38 10.98% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 60-67 28 8.09% 
Services 70-89 82 23.70% 
Public Administration 90-99 5 1.45% 
Subtotal  346 100.00% 
 
  
85
 
Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Apparent Audit Failure Cases Included to Test Hypothesis 2 
Audit failure cases:                                      416 companies   779 firm/years  
Less: observations without  
         required Compustat variables:            222 companies   466 firm/years 
Sample included for testing H2:                 194 Companies  313 firm/years 
 
Industry SIC Code Number of Observations Percentage 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 01-09 1 0.52% 
Mining 10-14 5 2.58% 
Construction 15-17 4 2.06% 
Manufacturing 20-39 69 35.57% 
Transportation & Public Utilities 40-49 17 8.76% 
Wholesale Trade 50-51 8 4.12% 
Retail Trade 52-59 19 9.79% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 60-67 5 2.58% 
Services 70-89 65 33.51% 
Public Administration 90-99 1 0.52% 
Subtotal  194 100.00% 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Apparent Audit Failure Cases Included to Test H3 
Audit failure cases:                                        416 companies     779 firm/years  
Less: observations without  
          required forecasts variables:                293 companies     571 firm/years 
Sample included for testing H2:                    123 Companies   208 firm/years 
 
Industry SIC Code Number of Observations Percentage 
Mining 10-14 5 4.07% 
Construction 15-17 3 2.44% 
Manufacturing 20-39 53 43.09% 
Transportation & Public Utilities 40-49 10 8.13% 
Wholesale Trade 50-51 2 1.63% 
Retail Trade 52-59 13 10.57% 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 60-67 6 4.88% 
Services 70-89 30 24.39% 
Public Administration 90-99 1 0.81% 
Subtotal  123 100.00% 
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Table 2: Observations in Each Comparison 
 Audit Failure Group Matched Control Group 
  Comparison 1 
Number of Observations 616 616 
Big auditors 502 502 
Non-Big auditors  114 114 
  Comparison 2 
Number of Observations 502 502 
Big auditors 502 502 
Non-Big auditors  0 0 
  Comparison 3 
Number of Observations 114 114 
Big auditors 0 0 
Non-Big auditors  114 114 
  Comparison 4 
Number of Observations 463 463 
Big auditors 463 0 
Non-Big auditors  0 463 
  Comparison 5 
Number of Observations 114 114 
Big auditors 0 114 
Non-Big auditors  114 0 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Observations Included in Testing H1 
Comparison 1         
 Auditor Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means
a
 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
TA 2421.1010 135.5100 8309.7470 1860.2880 114.5100 6508.7950 0.1875 0.332 
P 17.4288 12.2500 17.7024 18.3725 12.0630 22.4992 0.4135 0.9602 
EPS -0.0065 0.3450 7.0179 0.7458 0.5000 5.7049 0.0392 0.0022 
BVPS 7.6564 12.2500 9.7234 8.6550 5.7230 16.2675 0.1913 0.2421 
Comparison 2         
 Auditor Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
TA 2958.4940 224.6000 9121.2050 2243.6640 182.2900 7122.9120 0.1667 0.2256 
P 19.4984 14.7500 17.9248 21.2554 15.2500 23.8012 0.1867 0.5052 
EPS 0.01631 0.4900 7.7616 0.9306 0.7850 6.2850 0.0405 0.0007 
BVPS 8.7918 6.2610 10.2356 9.9054 6.9360 17.6025 0.2208 0.3822 
Comparison 3         
 Auditor Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
TA 54.6836 16.7150 138.4634 172.0858 15.0150 1447.4700 0.3904 0.9080 
P 8.3157 4.0000 13.3492 5.6772 3.4380 6.6272 0.0605 0.2113 
EPS -0.1072 -0.0100 0.9703 -0.0679 0.0200 1.0853 0.7734 0.8574 
BVPS 3.1489 1.1916 4.3721 2.6570 1.7497 5.3825 0.4496 0.0890 
Comparison 4         
 Auditor Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
TA 3008.3940 211.5500 9391.1080 1393.2470 64.5000 9913.3340 0.0111 0.0000 
P 19.6246 14.5000 18.3666 15.1947 8.8750 22.0622 0.0009 0.0000 
EPS -0.0472 0.4700 8.0709 0.5576 0.3700 1.6394 0.1147 0.9536 
BVPS 8.5995 6.1680 10.4589 7.8357 4.9530 13.6130 0.3386 0.0002 
Comparison 5         
 Auditor Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
TA 54.6836 16.7150 138.4634 46.9001 23.3100 70.6154 0.5932 0.0426 
P 8.3157 4.0000 13.3492 10.3906 6.7500 14.9525 0.2691 0.0038 
EPS -0.1072 -0.0100 0.9703 0.1656 0.0900 1.3441 0.0796 0.0309 
BVPS 3.1489 1.1916 4.3721 4.7300 3.3794 5.4881 0.0018 0.0000 
TA: Total asset at the end of the fiscal year t; 
P:   Stock price, 3 month after the end of the fiscal year t; 
EPS: Earnings per share excluding extraordinary items for fiscal year t; 
BVPS: Book value of equity per share at the end of the fiscal year t; 
 
a. Both p-values of the two-sample t-test and the nonparametric two-sample Wilcoxonon test are 
given.
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Table 4: Comparison of R
2
s Using z-test Based on Cramer Procedure 
Regression Model: ititit BVPSEPSP 21 αα +=  
Comparison  Failure Group Non-Failure Group 
1 Auditor 
m 
R
2
 
φ  
λ  
Mean(R
2
) 
Stddev(R
2
) 
Both Big non-Big auditor 
616 
0.1714 
0.1710 
127.0466 
0.1735 
0.0264 
Both Big non-Big auditor 
616 
0.4179 
0.4171 
440.8363 
0.4190 
0.0270 
 z-statistic                                                       6.4977
*** 
2
a 
Auditor 
m 
R
2
 
φ  
λ  
Mean(R
2
) 
Stddev(R
2
) 
Big auditor 
502 
0.1555 
0.1550 
92.0976 
0.1582 
0.0286 
Big  auditor 
502 
0.4129 
0.4120 
351.7144 
0.4142 
0.0210 
 z-statistic                                                       6.1826
*** 
3
b 
Auditor 
m 
R
2
 
φ  
λ  
Mean(R
2
) 
Stddev(R
2
) 
Non-Big auditor 
114 
0.0266 
0.0261 
3.0559 
0.0353 
0.0369 
Non-Big auditor 
114 
0.3555 
0.3515 
61.7820 
0.3624 
0.0651 
 z-statistic                                                       4.3668
*** 
4
a 
Auditor 
m 
R
2
 
φ  
λ  
Mean(R
2
) 
Stddev(R
2
)) 
Big  auditor 
463 
0.1628 
0.1622 
89.6446 
0.1656 
0.0301 
Non-Big  auditor 
463 
0.4827 
0.4816 
430.1949 
0.4839 
0.0291 
 z-statistic                                                        7.6015
*** 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
5
b 
Auditor 
m 
R
2
 
φ  
λ  
Mean(R
2
) 
Stddev(R
2
) 
Non-Big  auditor 
114 
0.0266 
0.0261 
3.0559 
0.0353 
0.0369 
Big  auditor 
114 
0.1939 
0.1911 
26.9346 
0.2046 
0.1939 
 z-statistic                                                       0.8578 
a. In comparison 2 and 4, audit failure group is the same group except the number of 
observations differs. Failure group in both comparisons represents companies audited by 
Big auditors. In comparison 4, I dropped some failure group companies since I cannot find 
the matched pairs audited by non-Big auditors. 
b. In comparison 3 and 5, audit failure group is the same group since it represents audit failure 
companies audited by non-Big auditors.  
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
**   Significant at 0.05 
*     Significant at 0.1 
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Table 5: Comparisons of Confidence Intervals for R
2
s Based on Cramer 
Procedure 
Regression Model: ititit BVPSEPSP 21 αα +=  
Comparison  Failure Group Non-Failure Group 
1 Auditor 
 
83% CI 
Both Big and non-Big 
auditor 
 
 
(0.1369, 0.2101) 
Both Big and non-Big 
auditor 
 
 
(0.3816, 0.4564) 
2 Auditor 
 
83% CI 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1187, 0.1978) 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3727, 0.4558) 
3 Auditor 
 
83% CI 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(-0.0159, 0.0865) 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.2721, 0.4526) 
4 Auditor 
 
83% CI 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1240, 0.2073) 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.4436, 0.5242) 
5 Auditor 
 
83% CI 
Non-Big  auditor 
 
 
(-0.0157, 0.0865) 
Big  auditor 
 
 
(-0.0639, 0.4731) 
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Table 6: Comparisons of Bootstrap Percentile Confidence Intervals for R
2
s 
Regression Model: ititit BVPSEPSP 21 αα +=  
Comparison  Failure Group Non-Failure Group 
1 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile CI 
Both Big and non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1344, 0.2234) 
Both Big and non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3555, 0.4825) 
2 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile CI 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1175, 0.2072) 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3520, 0.4877) 
3 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile CI 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.0068, 0.1161) 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.2640, 0.5030) 
4 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile CI 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1229, 0.2207) 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3965, 0.6054) 
5 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile CI 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.0068, 0.1161) 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.0822, 0.5369) 
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Table 7: Comparisons of Bootstrap Percentile Confidence Intervals for R
2
s 
Regression Model: ititit BVPSEPSP 21 αα +=  
Comparison  Failure Group Non-Failure Group 
1 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile t CI 
Both Big and non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1232, 0.2110) 
Both Big and non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3489, 0.4779) 
2 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile t CI 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1071, 0.1970) 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3322, 0.4717) 
3 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile t CI 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(-0.0582, 0.0596) 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1934, 0.4461) 
4 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile t CI 
Big auditor 
 
 
(0.1084, 0.2061) 
Non-Big auditor 
 
 
(0.3384, 0.5621) 
5 Auditor 
 
83% Bootstrap Percentile t CI 
Non-Big auditor 
 
(-0.0582, 0.0596) 
Big auditor 
 
(-0.1012, 0.3319) 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Observations Included in Testing H2 
 
All 
N=616 
Audit Failure Group 
N=313 
Matched Control Group 
N=313 Compare Means 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
TA                                       2388.2100 120.6100 8539.0550 2794.9110 140.1600 10186.0700 1981.5090 107.6100 6478.9400 0.2338 0.6582 
MTB 2.9980 2.1740 10.5046 3.4395 2.2200 9.0666 2.5571 2.1240 11.7666 0.2937 0.4168 
LEV 0.1870 0.1172 0.1985 0.2017 0.1347 0.2056 0.1723 0.0836 0.1904 0.0637 0.0527 
OCF 199.1160 3.5250 986.9473 184.3836 1.4900 1023.1420 213.8475 5.3100 950.7874 0.7091 0.0018 
ABTAC 165.7160 8.7650 713.7503 0.2336 0.0977 0.4739 0.1506 0.0828 0.3447 0.0125 0.0028 
TA: Total asset at the end of the fiscal year t; 
DAC: Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the Modified Jones Model; 
MTB: Market to book ratio; 
LEV:  Leverage, calculated as long-term debt divided by total assets; 
OCF: Cash flows from operating activities; 
ABTAC: Absolute value of total accruals. 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix
a
 for Variables in Testing H2 
 DAC AF MTB LEV LGTA ABTAC OCF 
DAC 1.0000 0.0102 0.0506 -0.0982 -0.0117 0.0794 0.1445 
AF 0.1135 1.0000 0.0420 0.0742 0.0256 0.0101 -0.0149 
MTB 0.0728 0.0325 1.0000 -0.1836 0.0113 0.0170 0.0189 
LEV -0.2089 0.0775 -0.1559 1.0000 0.2424 0.0494 0.0333 
LGTA -0.1327 0.0177 0.0297 0.3298 1.0000 0.4566 0.4274 
ABTAC 0.0627 0.0632 0.0487 0.2616 0.8642 1.0000 0.9181 
OCF -0.2306 -0.1247 0.0934 0.1739 0.6247 0.5083 1.0000 
DAC: The absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using Modified Jones Model 
AF: audit failure, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating audit failure company and 0 indicating the control 
company; 
MTB: Market to book ratio; 
LEV: Leverage, calculated as the long-term debt divided by total assets; 
LGTA: Natural logarithm of total assets; 
ABTAC: The absolute value of total accruals; 
OCF: Cash flows from operating activities. 
 
a: Pearson correlations are reported in the upper diagonal; Spearman correlations are reported in the lower 
diagonal. 
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Table 10: Results for Testing H2 
 
Panel A: Comparing Means 
Audit Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means 
Mean Median Std.Dev Mean Median Std.Dev. t-test Wilcoxon Test 
0.6327 0.1562 2.0465 0.5902 0.1114 2.1380 0.7999 0.0045 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
ABTACOCFLEVMTBLGTAAFDACit 6543210 βββββββ ++++++=  
 Coefficient Std. Error t value P value 
(Intercept) 0.8623 0.2275 3.7900 0.0002 
AF 0.1091 0.1646 0.6630 0.5077 
LGTA -0.0388 0.0412 -0.9410 0.3468 
MTB 0.0063 0.0080 0.7860 0.4319 
LEV -0.8808 0.4357 -2.0210 0.0437 
OCF 0.0010 0.0002 4.5930 0.0000 
ABTAC -0.0009 0.0003 -3.1360 0.0018 
Rsquare 0.0513  Adj. Rsquare 0.0421 
F-statistic: 5.5750  p-value: 0.0000 
DAC: The absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using Modified Jones Model 
AF: audit failure, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating audit failure company and 0 indicating the control 
company; 
MTB: Market to book ratio; 
LEV: Leverage, calculated as the long-term debt divided by total assets; 
LGTA: Natural logarithm of total assets; 
ABTAC: The absolute value of total accruals; 
OCF: Cash flows from operating activities. 
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Observations Included in Testing H3 
 
All 
N=416 
Audit Failure Group 
N=208 
Matched Control Group 
N=208 Compare Means 
 Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev Mean Median Stddev T-test 
Wilcoxo
n Test 
TA 3768.1000 513.8400 3.2529 4316.3710 533.2465 10479.0000 3219.8290 504.0050 7707.5650 0.2248 0.6260 
EPS 1.3300 0.9300 6.5053 0.8060 0.8650 1.4440 1.8539 1.0650 9.0667 0.1012 0.0128 
FCEPS  1.0861 0.9000 3.2529 1.2492 0.9450 1.6929 0.9230 0.7550 4.2772 0.3073 0.0309 
N 9.4980 6.0000 8.4918 9.7981 7.0000 8.6072 9.1971 6.0000 8.3847 0.5010 0.4924 
STD 0.1258 0.0300 0.5049 0.1104 0.0300 0.2482 0.1412 0.0300 0.6700 0.5357 0.5404 
LAG 105.5000 106.0000 2.0393 105.3990 106.0000 2.0381 105.6202 106.0000 2.0395 0.2693 0.2648 
TA: Total assests; 
EPS: Earnings per share excluding extraordinary items; 
FCEPS: Analysts’ median forecasted EPS; 
FE: Forecast errors, calculated as absolute value of the difference of forecasted EPS and reported EPS; 
N: Number of analysts’ forecasts; 
STD: Standard deviation of analysts’ median earnings forecasts. 
LAG: The lag between forecast dates and the fiscal year end. 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix
a
 for Variables in Testing H3 
 FE AF LGTA LAG N STD 
FE 1.0000 -0.0721 0.0657 0.0734 -0.0151 0.1632 
AF -0.0394 1.0000 0.0297 -0.0543 0.0354 -0.0305 
LGTA 0.1731 0.0239 1.0000 0.0917 0.6492 0.1160 
LAG 0.0290 -0.0548 0.0740 1.0000 0.0008 0.0391 
N 0.1158 0.0337 0.6794 -0.0637 1.0000 0.1022 
STD 0.0479 0.0301 0.2816 -0.0560 0.3034 1.0000 
FE: Forecast errors, calculated as the absolute value of the difference of the forecasted EPS and reported EPS; 
AF: Audit failure, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating audit failure company and value 0 indicating the 
control company; 
LGTA: Natural logarithm of total assets; 
LAG: The lag between the forecasts dates and fiscal year end; 
N: the number of forecasts; 
STD: is the standard deviation of the median analysts’ forecasts. 
 
a: Pearson correlations are reported in the upper diagonal; Spearman correlations are reported in the lower 
diagonal. 
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Table 13: Results for Testing H3 
 
Panel A: Comparing Means 
Audit Failure Group Matched Control Group Compare Means 
Mean Median Std.Dev Mean Median Std.Dev. t-test Wilcoxon Test 
0.9960 0.5250 1.6623 1.9594 0.5600 9.2967 0.1427 0.4220 
 
Panel B: Regression Analysis 
STDNLAGLGTAAFFEit 543210 λλλλλλ +++++=  
 coefficients std error t value p-value 
Intercept -18.8462 16.8335 -1.1200 0.2636 
AF -0.8572 0.6485 -1.3220 0.1870 
LGTA 0.3758 0.2225 1.6890 0.0920 
LAG 0.1781 0.1602 1.1120 0.2669 
N -0.0783 0.0503 -1.5570 0.1203 
STD 2.1836 0.6467 3.3770 0.0008 
Rsquare 0.0428  Adj. Rsquare 0.0312 
F-statistic: 3.6700  p-value: 0.0029 
FE: Forecast errors, calculated as the absolute value of the difference of the forecasted EPS and reported EPS; 
AF: Audit failure, a dummy variable with value 1 indicating audit failure company and value 0 indicating the 
control company; 
LGTA: Natural logarithm of total assets; 
LAG: The lag between the forecasts dates and fiscal year end; 
N: the number of forecasts; 
STD: is the standard deviation of the median analysts’ forecasts. 
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Figure 1:  Histograms and Q-Q Plots for Comparison 1 
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Figure 1 (Continued) 
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Figure 2:  Histograms and Q-Q Plots for Comparison 2 
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Figure 2 (Continued)
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Figure 3:  Histograms and Q-Q Plots for Comparison 3 
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Figure 3 (Continued)
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Figure 4:  Histograms and Q-Q Plots for Comparison 4 
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Figure 4 (Continued) 
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Figure 5:  Histograms and Q-Q Plots for Comparison 5 
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Figure 5 (Continued) 
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Figure 5 (Continued) 
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